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PROPERTY AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY: DEMOCRACY,
OLIGARCHY, AND THE CASE OF UKRAINE
MONICA EPPINGER*

ABSTRACT
Widening wealth gaps in Western democracies have brought new scrutiny to relationships between property and political community. For the
prior quarter century, Western legal scholars have urged privatization
around the globe as the key to a virtuous circle of “market democracy.”
This Article traces the origins of the market democracy consensus to ideas
that identify positive features of political community—liberty, wealth, or
democracy—with private property ownership. Fieldwork in Ukraine,
where Western privatization advice was followed at a time of founding a
new polity, provides data to compare predictions with outcomes. Two
unexpected figures—the Oligarch and the Precariat—emerge from the
newly privatized countryside. Research into the micropractices of privatization counter-intuitively exposes private property as potentially working against democracy. The findings from this research are that
oligarchy is a possibility, distribution is a problem, and relationships
between property and democracy are not always mutually felicitous.

INTRODUCTION: PROPERTY

AND

POLITICAL COMMUNITY

The relationship between property and political community has
recently come under renewed scrutiny. Anxiety about the resilience of democracy in a time of widening wealth gaps1 and growing
* Assistant Professor of Law and of Anthropology, Saint Louis University. J.D., Yale
Law School and Ph.D., University of California Berkeley. I thank Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Bob Ellickson, Jim Whitman, Carol Rose, Intisar Rabb, and Duncan Kennedy for feedback
and Laura Nader for support for the project. Portions of this paper benefitted from presentation at the Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Workshop, an American Society for Comparative Law workshop, the Danyliw Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, the
American Association of Law Schools Comparative Law session, at Harvard, New York University, Wake Forest, Washington University, and Saint Louis University Schools of Law,
and at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute Department of Sociology. Research was supported by
National Science Foundation, Fulbright-Hays, and Yale Law School Olin fellowships; and
Yale Agrarian Studies, Yale European Studies, and University of California Berkeley Program in Post-Soviet Studies grants.
1. See John P. McCormick, Keep the Public Rich, but the Citizens Poor: Economic and Political Inequality in Constitutions, Ancient and Modern, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 879 (2013) (arguing
economic inequality invariably undermines political equality and hence liberty); see also
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS
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institutional closeness between governments and financial capital2
have raised concerns in industrialized democracies of a drift
towards oligarchy.3 While questions about property and political
community go back at least to Aristotle,4 the post-Cold War period
has seen the role of property in democracy celebrated as much as
investigated.5 New developments suggest the recent past deserves
reconsideration.
The dearth of critical examination is all the more surprising
given property’s prominence. Property in theory and property in
ideology are two protagonists of the history of the twentieth century. Major social theories like socialism and liberalism depend on
property as their primary explanatory principle. Theory inspired
twentieth-century revolutions that took fundamental change in
land tenure regime as a central goal. Property assumed an equally
prominent role in ideology during a Cold War in which geopolitical rivals made differing property regimes a linchpin of self-definition. At the Cold War’s end in 1991, property theory became a
tool for diagnosing systemic ills and property doctrine, a proposed
remedy. It was a time when, surveying draft post-socialist constitu-

OUR FUTURE (2013); TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING INECRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2013).
2. See, e.g., Simon Johnson, Financial Oligarchy and the Crisis, 16 BROWN J. WORLD AFF.
159, 159–60 (2010) (arguing the 2008 financial crisis resulted from “political capture,” the
financial sector’s relationships with government); see also, e.g., Simon Johnson, The Quiet
Coup, ATLANTIC (May 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/
the-quiet-coup/307364/ (explaining prevalence of “cultural capture,” a form of oligarchy
ruling not through coercion but through suasion in favor of more and unregulated
finance).
3. See Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 669, 669–70 (2014) (proposing that as structures of opportunity narrow, the U.S. is
becoming an oligarchy rather than a republic).
4. See Aristotle, Politics 191–92 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1943 (306
B.C.)) (“Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate
and sufficient property; for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may
arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either
extreme”); see also, e.g., 1 MONTESQUIEU, 1 SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, 50–51 (facsimile reprod.
1984) (1751) (suggesting republican virtue cannot bear great disparities of wealth, requiring equality and “mediocrity” of fortunes), cited in Carol Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 359 (1996) [hereinafter Rose, Keystone Right].
5. See, e.g., John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 5 (John Williamson ed., 1990) (identifying
ten principles followed by Latin American governments to deal with the 1980s debt crises,
including privatization of state enterprises and legal security for property rights, a set that
became known as “the Washington Consensus”).
QUALITY
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tions, the right to real property could be called the “most sacred.”6
It was, in legal scholarship, the Property Moment.7
A goal emerged for Western-led reform efforts around the
world,8 a system of economics and governance that came to be
called “market democracy.”9 This seemingly straightforward
goal—still guiding action today—unites under one banner several
competing (and in some respects, unreconciled) programs.10 Analyzing its origins and outcomes is a primary goal of this Article. As
a policy and ideal, “market democracy” was articulated and propagated from West to East across many powerful discourses: economics, technical advising, diplomacy, advertising. This Article focuses
on law as a discipline from which some of the logic of market
democracy emerged and as the discipline upon which other disciplines relied to test the sufficiency of logical claims. This Article
6. Mark Ellis, Drafting Constitutions: Property Rights in Central and Eastern Europe, 19
YALE J. INT’L L. 197, 198 (1994) (calling the right to real property “the most sacred” among
economic and social rights in draft post-Socialist constitutions).
7. As evidence of interest in property as a constitutional right in U.S. legal scholarship of the time, see, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992). Coincidentally, the sunset of the
socialist bloc coincided with a growing “property rights movement” in the United States.
On the latter, see Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 4, at 329 n.2 (1996) (finding property
rights movement expressed in state legislatures’ acts to restrain governmental “takings” of
private property). As an example of scholarly advocacy in the Property Rights movement,
see, e.g., Brief for The Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo et al. v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108) (authored by Richard Epstein and
Mark Moller).
8. For critique of U.S.-led economic reform efforts in central and eastern Europe,
see JANINE R. WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION: THE STRANGE CASE OF WESTERN AID TO
EASTERN EUROPE (2011) [hereinafter WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION]. For analysis of
pattern of Western attempts to transplant legal systems and norms, see UGO MATTEI AND
LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL (2008). But see James Q. Whitman, Western Legal Imperialism: Thinking about Deep Historical Roots, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L.
305 (2009) (arguing the roots of Western attempts to export legal reform are part of a
missionizing impulse extending much farther back than Mattei and Nader posit, to 7001000 C.E.).
9. See, e.g., Anthony Lake, U.S. Nat’l Sec. Adviser, From Containment to Enlargement, Remarks at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
(Sept. 21, 1993), [hereinafter Lake, Containment to Enlargement], available at http://
www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/iterl/lakedoc.html (stating the U.S. in 1993 has an obligation
and opportunity to lead “people on every continent” who are concluding “America’s core
concepts — democracy and market economics” are “the most productive and liberating
ways to organize their lives.”). See infra Section II.C. (discussing the emergence of a “market democracy” consensus from discordant property traditions).
10. See Gregory S. Alexander, A Fourth Way?: Economic Transformation in the Post-Communist World, 20 CORNELL L. F. 3, 8 (1993) [hereinafter Alexander, A Fourth Way] (warning
that “market economy” is a vague concept that permits people to read into it a range of
conflicting values).
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also focuses on law because Western legal academics inserted
themselves into advocacy of post-Soviet reforms in powerful ways.
Western thinkers, predicting felicitous relationships between private property and democracy,11 identified private property as the
key to market democracy.12 Legal scholars weighed in.13 At a time
of fundamental systemic change, a basic political and economic reordering, Property was set loose to do its work. Property became
the sine qua non of peaceful regime change, a fundamental constitutional issue, the key right to a liberal order.14
We now enjoy a vantage from which to assess results in years following the Property Moment. Did property deliver? Or rather,
What did property deliver? This Article, following Frank
Michelman and Duncan Kennedy’s admonition that the economic
efficiency of private property be tested rather than assumed15, likewise subjects the promises of Property in regard to political community to empirical investigation. The case I investigate is postSoviet transformation in Ukraine.
Ukraine presents a prime candidate for such a study for several
reasons. An object of intense Western advising,16 Ukraine adopted
11. See Lake, Containment to Enlargement, supra note 9 (“Both processes strengthen
each other: democracy alone can produce justice, but not the material goods necessary for
individuals to thrive; markets alone can expand wealth, but not that sense of justice without which civilized societies perish.”).
12. See infra Section II.C. (tracing the place of private property in discussions of
democracy reforms). But see Stephen S. Cohen & Andrew Schwartz, The Tunnel at the End of
the Light: Privatization in Eastern Europe, 7 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 7, 11–12 (1994) [hereinafter
Cohen & Schwartz, Privatization in Eastern Europe] (arguing against rapid privatization in
former socialist countries to allow time for development of regulatory institutions).
13. See, e.g., Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 4; Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 907 (1993); Alexander, A Fourth Way, supra note 10. At the
time, Michael Heller did not participate as an academic; rather, he advised directly, serving
as a World Bank consultant to post-socialist governments on matters including land privatization; see Michael A. Heller, Property Rights: A View from the Trenches, 19 YALE J. INT’L L.
203, 203 [hereinafter Heller, View from the Trenches]. For his scholarly reflection on the
changes of that time, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 628 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, AntiCommons].
14. See Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 4 (summarizing seven arguments that property
is the key to liberal order).
15. Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 744, 749 (1980) (arguing that the incentive effects of property and contract rules cannot be known without empirical investigation).
16. Ukraine became recipient of the third-largest package of U.S. assistance in the
world, second only to assistance provided to Israel and Egypt under the Camp David
Accords; subtracting military assistance, Ukraine was first in U.S. assistance in the world by
1996. See 1996: The Year in Review, UKR. WEEKLY (Dec. 29, 1996), http://www.ukr
weekly.com/old/archive/1996/529609.shtml; see also OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF U.S.
ASSISTANCE TO THE NIS, U.S. DEP’T ST., GOV’T ASSISTANCE TO AND COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES
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property reform as part of a fundamental political restructuring.
This investigation is timely, coming after privatization has passed
through its legislated implementation period. Finally, Ukraine is
currently in an acute position of taking stock and assessing the
results of post-Soviet experiments. In a time of our own concerns
about property and political community, we face a common set of
questions.
Taking Western advice, the Ukrainian parliament passed a Land
Code providing rights to private ownership in land in 2001 with a
five-year implementation period beginning in 2002.17 To investigate the results, I conducted on-site field research on the Land
Code and its implementation at intervals beginning shortly after
the implementation period began in 2002, totaling more than
twenty months over twelve years.18 Among agriculturalists, I conducted interviews and observation on two different types of farms:
parcels farmed by smallholders as allocated by the state and farmlands that have since been consolidated.19 I also interviewed parliamentarians, rural outmigrants, judges, small agribusiness
managers, and oligarchs. This Article reports my findings.
Assessing gains or losses from following Western property doctrine is worthwhile in itself, but market democracy advising promised more. Accordingly, this Article concentrates on critical
inquiry into claims about relationships between property and political community. Amid a fresh preoccupation with the “basic conception of political community”20 and analysis of structural features

NEW INDEP. STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION FY 1996 REPORT (1997), available at http://www.fpa.org/usr_doc/37315.pdf.
17. Land Code of Ukraine, 2001 Laws No. 2905-III (Uryadovy Kur’yer [Government
Courier, the official reporter of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine], Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Land Code].
18. Field research in Ukraine took place over two months in 2002, fourteen months
in 2006–2007, and in follow-up trips in 2009, 2012, 2013, and 2014.
19. This research was further informed by my two and half years’ experience as a U.S.
diplomat stationed in Embassy Kiev, serving as embassy liaison to parliament during the
drafting, passage, and early implementation of Ukraine’s post-Soviet constitution in 1996
and 1997. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., U.S. DEP’T ST., COUNTRY HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT ON UKRAINE (1996), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/
human_rights/1996_hrp_report/ukraine.html.
20. “Political community” emerged in U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence in the early
1970s. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 300, 344 (1971) (allowing a state law imposing
residence requirement for voting rights because it may be necessary “to preserve the basic
conception of a political community”), aff’d in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642–43
(1971) (recognizing a state’s broad power to define its “political community”).
WITH THE
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that shape it,21 relationships between property and political community deserve their analytical due.
ROADMAP
The first two Sections of this Article describe encounters
between U.S. bodies of property theory and Soviet practice in
order to trace the emergence of market democracy as an ideal with
property at its core. In Section I, I identify three significant bodies
of thought—three explanations of the relationship between property and political community—shaping Western legal thinkers’
background22 in the 1980s and 1990s. These bodies of thought
have their own folk histories, totemic personages, and consciously
deployed icons. My aim here is not historiographical, to relate for
each a definitive version or to “correct” misperceptions of current
thinkers about their own intellectual roots. The historical material
cited is, instead, meant to relate these thinkers’ accounts on their
own terms.23 Ideas matter, as do their embedded understandings
of human nature. Reviewing their various claims and logics helps
us to understand what is meant by “market democracy” and how
that term encompasses goals arising out of uncoordinated and
potentially irreconcilable idioms.
U.S. legal thinkers informed by these three accounts of property
encountered a well-developed body of property theory, legal doctrine, and practice in the former Soviet republics. In Section II, I
briefly describe Soviet property in theory and practice, the institutional field upon which Western legal theories were brought to
bear. The second part of Section II deals with encounters between
U.S. theory and Soviet experience. A critique of the Soviet property regime, extending Western scholarship on the commons,
became formulated as diagnosis and contributed to casting private
property as remedy. The process of getting from socialism to market democracy, the “curative process,” was privatization. Together,
21. See James A. Gardner, Federalism & Subnational Political Community, 127 HARV. L.
REV. F. 153, 154–55 (2013–2014) (describing qualities that make a community a “political
community,” as a state should be, if it is to check overextensions of national power under
U.S. constitutional plan); see also Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of
Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander & Peñalver,
Properties of Community].
22. For explanation of background, see JOHN SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 143–44 (1983).
23. The method of trying to understand a person’s patterns of thought on their own
terms undertaken here is referred to as an emic approach. (The alternative is a cross-cultural etic approach.) See KENNETH PIKE, LANGUAGE IN RELATION TO A UNIFIED THEORY OF
THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1954).
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the first two Sections describe the work that property as an analytic
category does in competing theories of the late twentieth century.
Overall, they give background for Sections III and IV, which show
how the patient fared once the remedy was applied.
Section III, reporting from the field, tells the story of a postprivatization rural boomtown characterized by explosive growth—
not in population, but in the productivity of its agricultural sector.
It shows how privatization operates together with other experimental forms in the lived experience of post-socialism, how oligarchy
puts down roots in the soil of private property ownership. Section
IV describes alternative spaces away from the intense cultivation of
property profits and patron-client relations, in which implementation of the same laws has given rise to different outcomes. What I
call the “ghost town” is deserted both of prosperity and part of its
population, but not of democratic forms, which are robust and
lively. The central figure arising from each of these contexts defies
predictions. These two Sections reveal some of the micropractices
of transition to a private property regime and the legal doctrines
that provide the framework for those practices. This is the context
in which a nascent oligarchy has been built and from which impoverished former collective farmers have fled. The former became
the object of mass protests in Ukraine in 2014; the latter, members
of the masses that toppled the government.24 Between the two, we
find practices, patterns of thought, and forms of sociability that
may be assets in constructing a livable future.
Existing scholarship and policy present the relationship between
private property ownership and democratic governance as a virtuous circle: property, serving both economic and political ends, promotes both prosperity and democracy.25 My main finding reported
in the Conclusion is that the beneficial effects of private property
ownership on democracy are not as uniform as predicted. When it
comes to wealth gaps, political community, and state vulnerability,
Ukraine may present a precocious case to which those in other
industrialized countries should attend. This is a moment of great
vulnerability for the Ukrainian state, and the story narrated here
gives background on key features of the political structures that
have made it so. In addition to rounding out the picture of what is
occurring on the ground in Ukraine, we gain insight into settings
24. See, e.g,. Andrew Higgins, With President’s Departure, Ukraine Moves Toward a Murky
Future, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2014, at A15 (describing mass demonstrations and the flight of
the government they opposed).
25. See infra Part II.C.

\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\47-4\JLE403.txt

832

unknown

Seq: 8

The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.

5-AUG-15

9:46

[Vol. 47

closer to home through a fresh perspective on relationships
between property and political community. This work may provide
a humbling reminder of unintended consequences of exporting
legal doctrines, or inspire wider consideration of the illiberal
results of liberal initiatives.
I.

PROPERTY

AND

POLITICAL COMMUNITY: THREE ACCOUNTS

With the passing of Soviet state socialism, a new system of political and economic organization including a new property regime
could be considered in its place, evoking for Western scholars and
experts pre-existing understandings of how property works in constituting political community. The bodies of theory outlined in this
Section each provide an account of how property and systems of
governance are related. In each, a different figure26 of the property owner emerges. Discerning that figure lends insight into
assumptions made about human nature embedded in the theory.
In other words, just as each property theory has its own account of
the relationship between property and polity, its own political theory and sociology, each property theory also incorporates its own
understanding of the human, its own anthropology. Given the
focus on political community, this Section concentrates on political
rather than economic claims of property theory. What follows here
are paradigmatic accounts, reflecting a moment in which nuance
was flattened; these accounts may seem commonplace, but it is in
their very taken-for-grantedness that their power lays.27 It is also
there that we find their capacity to surprise us.28 Together they
provide some of the intellectual equipment that U.S. legal thinkers
brought to bear when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991.
A.

The Liberty of Persons Account

The Liberty of Persons account starts from a conceptual division
between a private sphere and a state sphere. The private is a
trusted sphere for activity, interaction, and association between
individual actors. The state and the exercise of its authority are
26. These figures are not, strictly speaking, members of an economic “class.” They
stand for those positioned in a particular way within the economic order and sharing certain formations of affect, ethics, and aesthetics. They are characterized by their hopes,
dreams, and fears as much as by economic activities or social affiliation.
27. For an anthropological account of the power of things taken for granted, see generally Laura Nader, Controlling Processes: Tracing the Dynamic Components of Power, 38 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 711 (1997).
28. See infra Sections III & IV (relating some of the actual outcomes instituting private
property).

\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\47-4\JLE403.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 9

Property and Political Community: The Case of Ukraine

5-AUG-15

9:46

833

viewed skeptically. Personal autonomy and individual liberty are
most prized,29 and for them, property plays a major role in two
respects. I refer to them as “liberty against the state” and “liberty
within the private.”
1.

Property Liberty: Against the State

In the first version of the Liberty of Persons account, property
rights are an element of personal autonomy, or even a necessary
condition of individual liberty.30 The private sphere provides the
individual a space for defense against the depredations of the state.
State and private are co-constitutive in this account. By that, I
mean the shape of one determines the shape of the other. To
understand the private sphere in which property plays such an
important role in the Liberty of Persons account, one must understand how its adherents conceptualize the nature of the state and
the threats the state poses against which the private sphere is to
provide defense.
The contemporary Liberty of Persons account still bears outlines
of the shape it took in the eighteenth century, when absolutist aspirations had arisen across Europe and revolution against them was
fomenting in the Americas.31 The writings of Englishmen John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon from that time, collectively called
Cato’s Letters32, are emblematic of a Libertarian philosophical
29. See, e.g., Steve Pejovich, Liberty, Property Rights, and Innovation in Eastern Europe, 9
CATO J. 57, 57–58 (1989) (While the “real issue” in comparing socialism and capitalism is
their “comparative efficiency,” the value of a social system is simply “not verifiable by
econometric techniques” because it must be evaluated regarding its effects on “liberty,
human creativity, and new opportunities.”).
30. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS].
31. By “absolutism,” detractors in England and on the continent meant mechanisms
and procedures by which the arbitrary power of the state — principally, but now exclusively the monarch — was enhanced. Strictly speaking, absolutist monarchy was only
achieved in Denmark when the estates dissolved themselves and transferred all political
power to the king, but monarchists elsewhere aspiring to it took measures to weaken or
evade the powers of representative bodies. For discussion of absolutism in the context of a
history of ideas, see generally, QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT: VOL. II: THE AGE OF REFORMATION (1978).
32. Writing under the pseudonym “Cato,” Trenchard and Gordon produced a series
of articles (144 in three years, published in the London Journal and British Journal) that
became known collectively as Cato’s Letters. On the circulation of Cato’s Letters and currency of their ideas among American revolutionaries, see, e.g., CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 141
(1953) (asserting Cato’s Letters rather than Locke’s Civil Government was the most popular source of political ideas in colonial America).
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stance still trenchant today.33 Cato’s Letter No. 25 gives a representative example of influential early Libertarian views on state
power, tyranny, and property.34 Tyranny, in this account, stems
from structural sources for which any particular form of government, including representative government, is no panacea. Any
government falls prey to a divergence in interests between those in
power and those governed.35 Access to state power and the nature
of dominion, rather than any particular person’s failings, leads
inevitably to tyrannical tendencies in rulers.36
Power is, in the Cato account, uniquely, an attribute of the state.
In its less suspicious iterations, power is amoral, like fire; like fire,
power has the potential to serve humanity but is inherently dangerous and must be controlled.37 Unrestrained, or “lawless” power38
breeds many ills, visiting on individuals bloodshed and infringement of property rights39 and on nations, aggregate biopolitical
and wealth effects.40 Where “lawless power” is the problem, law
can be one of the solutions41 (a nascent argument for a rule of
law): legal restraints should first be used to control those in
power.42 The state should also safeguard the private sphere by protecting property rights and preserving law and order,43 in a world
33. See, e.g., About Cato, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/about (last visited Mar. 18,
2015) (explaining that U.S. Libertarian think-tank The Cato Institute takes its name from
the collective name for the Trenchard-Gordon articles, Cato’s Letters).
34. Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letter No. 25, Considerations on the Destructive Spirit of Arbitrary Power. With the Blessings of Liberty, and our own Constitution, (Apr. 15, 1721), available at
http://classicliberal.tripod.com/cato/letter025.html.
35. Id. (Divergence in interests between governing and governed is “the hard fate of
the world.”).
36. Id. (A “cruel spirit” may not be a tyrant’s natural character but is owing to “the
nature of the dominion” he exercises.).
37. Id.
38. Id. (“Lawless power” is so “monstrous” and the human so weak that a person
“ought never to be trusted with a power that is boundless.”).
39. Id. (An arbitrary prince and his subjects destroy one another, they plotting against
his life, he “shedding their blood, and plundering them of their property.”).
40. Id. (“The great continent of America is almost unpeopled, the Spaniards having
destroyed, ‘tis thought, about forty millions of its natives . . . .”). See also, e.g., MILTON
FRIEDMAN, THE RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND POLITICAL FREEDOM, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7–-21 (1962).
41. Id. (“Good laws make a good prince, if he has a good understanding; but the best
men grow mischievous when they are set above laws [. . .]”).
42. Id. (Because power “is apt to break its bounds, in all good governments nothing,
or as little as may be, ought to be left to chance, or the humours of men in authority: All
should proceed by fixed and stated rules, and upon any emergency, new rules should be
made.”).
43. James Madison, Property (Mar. 27, 1792), reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 266, 266–68 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (“Government is instituted to protect property of every sort . . . .”); see also FRIEDMAN, “The Role of Government in a Free
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in which the primary threat to property owners comes from the
state itself.
In this account, property proves an inseparable part of the conception of the private sphere. Private property in this schema
becomes a setting, a redoubt, for the autonomous person,44 so
important for the individual that rights to private property have
been characterized as central to a system of “natural rights”45
inhering to any physical person. There are differences across iterations but in any of the anti-tyranny Liberty of Persons accounts,
private property is indispensable either as a constituent element of
the private sphere, as a right conceptually inseparable from individual liberty, or as a precondition for individual liberty. The
proper role (if any) for government is reduced to restraining rulers
and safeguarding the private sphere; for many, that becomes
synonymous with safeguarding property rights. Protecting property from government seizure is an important part of guarding
against tyranny.46
2.

Property Liberty: Within the Private

There is a second respect in which property figures in the Liberty of Persons account, less concerned with the state than with
what happens within that private sphere itself. Property is a place
where ordinary people generate rules to order mutual expectations
or settle disputes, without making recourse to formal law or state
Society,” CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 40, at 22–36; Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 367, 383 (1991) (arguing that preventing harms to property is a governmental function consistent with the natural rights
tradition).
44. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH 1
(2008) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, HOUSEHOLD] (characterizing property in the private sphere
as an individual’s retreat from social life).
45. “The system of natural rights usually refers to the rights to acquire and own property, and to have exclusive liberty to control one’s own person and labor.” Richard
Epstein, A Last Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 253, 257 (1986).
46. This scholarship claims as its heritage, inter alia, James Madison’s drafting of the
Takings Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (Takings Clause); CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS xiii–xiv, 11–15 (Helen E.
Veit et al. eds., 1991) (reproducing Madison’s proposed resolution of amendments that
became the Bill of Rights, including the Takings clause); William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782,
791, 837 (1995) (analyzing Madison’s role in drafting of Takings Clause), cited in John F.
Hart, “A Less Proportion of Idle Proprietors”: Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 169 nn.12–13 (2001) [hereinafter Hart, Fee Tail]. But see Hart,
Fee Tail at 169 (arguing that Madison was not as libertarian as portrayed, supporting legislative interference with some forms of property, particularly inherited wealth, to defeat permanency by the equalizing tendency of the laws).
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institutions. Property becomes an experimental space for creating
“order without law.”47
Consider practices between neighbors in the private sphere.48 It
is not necessarily the perniciousness of the state or its tyrannical
officeholders that lead people to avoid contact with it. People have
other reasons. One is the complexity of formal substantive and
procedural rules, which in real life imposes costs for going through
state institutions. According to Robert Ellickson, Coasian predictions about when people would resort to the law or avoid it49 do
not, for example, fit with findings from his study of neighbors in
Shasta County, California where transaction costs lead people to
ignore law and work things out according to shared informal
norms in many instances.50 This critique is characteristic of the
Liberty of Persons account. Ronald Coase and others who err in
assuming that people can “effortlessly learn and enforce their initial legal entitlements”51 overstate the importance of the law, formal legal institutions, and the state.52
Consider, alternately, the intimate spaces of the household. The
household is another space in which inhabitants establish order
and come up with rules or other means for allocating resources
and settling disputes, generally ignoring formal law and state institutions as they go about it. “Liberal households”53 require, as the
background for their activities, several preconditions. One is a “liberal state,” a self-restraining or restrained state, limited from
intruding into the private sphere, content with “establishing a set
of background rules,” leaving individuals to “structure their own
47. Some of the impetus for studying “norms” and normative orders outside of formal
law in U.S. legal scholarship comes from this school of thought. See, e.g., ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, ORDER]
48. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STANFORD L. REV. 623 (1986).
49. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost] (in the parable of Farmer and Rancher given to illustrate Coase
Theorem, the absence of transaction costs renders law irrelevant).
50. ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 47, at 280.
51. Id. at 281.
52. For example, in The Problem of Social Cost, Coase proposes, “In a world in which
there are costs of rearranging the rights established by the legal system, the courts, in cases
relating to nuisance, are, in effect, making a decision on the economic problem and determining how resources are to be employed.” Coase, Social Cost, supra note 49, reprinted in
RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95, 132–33 (1988), cited in ELLICKSON,
ORDER, supra note 47, at 281.
53. The concept of the “liberal household” is elaborated in WILLIAM JAMES BOOTH,
HOUSEHOLDS: THE MORAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE ECONOMY (1993).
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living arrangements.”54 Another is a system of private property in
land, which “provides havens within which household members
can fashion their own domestic arrangements.”55
3.

The Rugged Individualist

The Liberty of Persons account depends on its own understanding of the human. One is the person occupying state office, the
antagonist lurking in the background of Epstein property liberty,
the Tyrant. The individual of the private sphere, the protagonist of
Epstein and Ellickson property liberty alike, is competent, decisive,
and as a matter of cognition better at taking decisions to arrange
her own affairs than a third party.56 We may call this central figure
of the Liberty of Persons account The Rugged Individualist, as long
as we understand that individualist to be engaged, often intensely,
in private ordering. Our Rugged Individualist is busily involved in
privately associating in order to fend off the state or to build up
rules and networks for allocating resources and working out disputes over their management. The point is not that the Rugged
Individualist is antisocial or apolitical. Rather, she finds political
community in private association. As a practical matter, the proximity and scale at which political association happens is usually
more local and smaller than the state: the household, the neighborhood, the county. Property in this account may be a topic of
discussion, an object of political community; property is certainly
the setting for it. Even the Rugged Individualist works on political
community, and property plays a central role in its constitution, in
the Liberty of Persons account.
B.

The Wealth of Nations Account

Not all see liberty leading to private order, or property necessarily as a space within which order without law is established. The
very liberty that affords an individual the authority to devise
schemes to co-operate within a household or between neighbors
also leaves open the logical possibility of the alternative. Just as we
can imagine order without law, we can imagine disorder without
law. Autonomous individuals may compete as well as cooperate.
Competition for resources raises the specter of disorder and for
54. ELLICKSON, HOUSEHOLD, supra note 44, at 14.
55. Id. at 15.
56. Id. at 14 (“The core tenet of liberalism is that a competent adult presumptively
can decide better than a state, master, parent, or other third party what arrangements best
suit that individual.”).
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some, this specter becomes a justification for institutions to keep
things sorted out. In this vision, property is not the space from
which one can achieve respite from the “hurly-burly of larger society”57 or carve out an autonomy unencroached upon by the state.
Rather, in this account property is a prize, the competition for
which calls for formal rules and justifies a third-party rule-maker,
adjudicator, and enforcer, the state. This account progresses
through several steps (some of which—its imagining of a commons, its free-trade conclusions—eventually dominate Western
advising to post-Soviet states).58 There are a variety of versions, but
they begin from a common starting point, the harvest of resources
from a commons.
1.

Property, Competition, and Political Community

The paradigmatic versions of this account, starting with John
Locke, open with industrious persons gathering the fruits of nature
and, eventually, forming associations to protect their stocks of
property from one another. “The great end of men’s entering into
society, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and
safety” depends on law as “the great instrument and means” in that
project.59 Thus Locke imagines the origins of state institutions.
William Blackstone similarly engages in an imaginary of the origins
of human political association. For him, it results from a transition
from use rights to ownership rights and from ownership to competition and disputes. In the beginning or shortly thereafter, Mankind’s increase demanded a reconceptualization of property, from
“immediate use” of objects from the wild commons to “more permanent dominion” over the “very substance of the thing.” “Otherwise, innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the good order of
the world been continually broken and disturbed, while a variety of
persons were striving who should get the first occupation of the
same thing, or disputing which of them had actually gained it.”60
As fanciful as these imaginative accounts may appear to us now,
they are employed as origin myths in the construction of some seri57. ELLICKSON, HOUSEHOLD, supra note 44, at 1.
58. See infra Sections II.B. and II.C. (discussing Western property discourse brought to
bear on the post-Soviet reform process).
59. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 11, § 134 (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE], available at https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/
politics/locke.
60. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 408–09 (W. Maxwell ed., 1865), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=7fhWAAAAcAAJ&printsec
=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\47-4\JLE403.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 15

Property and Political Community: The Case of Ukraine

5-AUG-15

9:46

839

ous conceptual apparatuses. In these stories, competition for
resources justifies government itself. As Adam Smith asserts in his
first lecture on jurisprudence, “The first and chief design of every
system of government is to maintain justice; to prevent the members of a society from incroaching [sic] on one anothers [sic] property, or siezing [sic] what is not their own.”61 Note that for Smith’s
individual, the threat of property seizure may come from other private property owners, not only the state.
At this point, the Wealth of Nations account makes a Libertarian
point on limiting the use of state power. If government is instituted to protect property, it follows that not even the sovereign or
other supreme power may strip a person of her property without
her consent.62 The American revolutionary slogan “No taxation
without representation” illustrates the logical work done by the origin story of laws and state to safeguard property: No state authority
may take a person’s property without her direct consent or her
consent given through a representative. Absent representation,
taxation amounts to an annihilation of property rights and works
an absurdity, that government annihilates the very thing, property,
which it is established to safeguard.63 Although they share a position on the necessity of private property being inviolate from government predation, the relationship of the property owner to the
state is fundamentally different in the Wealth of Nations account
than in the Liberty of Persons account. Instead of property primarily serving as a space of autonomy from the state, property is a
claim the state is devised to protect.
2.

The Pay-off: Property as Wealth-Creating Institution

The Wealth of Nations account offers a vision of the benefits of
property rights and the economic activity they support, what Carol
Rose calls “the standard story,” that property is a wealth-creating
institution.64 However, this “standard story” actually has at least
61. Adam Smith, Of Jurisprudence (Dec. 24. 1762), LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, vol. V
of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith 5 (R. L. Meek,
D. D. Raphael & P. G. Stein eds. 1982), available at http://www.estig.ipbeja.pt/~ac_direito/
Smith_0141.06.pdf.
62. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 59, ch. 11, § 138 (pointing out property
rights between subjects are not secure if a sovereign has the power to seize something, use
it, or dispose of it).
63. See, e.g., ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF
GREAT BRITAIN IN THE PRESENT DISPUTES WITH AMERICA 30 (J. Almon ed., 1775), available at
https://archive.org/stream/cihm_36238#page/n33/mode/2up (quoting Locke’s Second
Treatise § 138 as the basis for arguing against taxation without representation).
64. Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 4, at 330.
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three different versions in the retelling. One version is that of
establishing a claim on property through the labor of first capture.
In this story, some resource, sought because of its perceived preexisting value, is up for grabs: a fox, a cave, a record-setting baseball.65 One person establishes a superior claim through labor, cunning, first capture.66 Adherents of this view, citing to Locke,
propose that capturing a contested resource transforms it from an
object of undetermined legal status into property.67
Second is the story of creating wealth through labor on preexisting property. The resource is not up for grabs. Rather, the
question is, what induces a person to work on something that is
already her property? Secure property rights create—or rather,
are the basis of, in Jeremy Bentham’s phrasing—expectation.68
The expectation that my claim to a thing will be respected in the
future leads me to labor over or cultivate it in the meantime. Here,
law fosters the investment of labor into property that creates
wealth.69 “Law does not say to a man: ‘Work, and I will reward
you.’ It says rather: ‘Work, and by staying the hand that would tear
them from you, I will assure to you enjoyment of the fruits of your
toil . . . .’.”70 A society that safeguards property rights thus

65. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (allocating disposal of a fox); Edwards v. Sims, 232 Ky. 791, 24 S.W.2d 619 (1929) (regarding rival
claims to portions of the Great Onyx Cave); Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL
833731, at *1 (Cal. Super. Dec. 18, 2002) (considering rival claims to the baseball hit in
Barry Bonds’ record-setting 73rd homerun).
66. But see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 568 (1823) (disregarding
prior occupancy in favor of a doctrine of “dominion” to decide rival claims to lands
acquired from Native Americans).
67. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 59, ch. 5, § 27 (arguing that by removing
something from the state of nature, a claimant mixes his labor with it and thereby makes it
his property).
68. Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 145
(Charles Milner Atkinson trans. and ed., 1914), available at http://books.google.com/
books?id=fQg1AQAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=bentham+principles+of+the+civil+
code&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Vi7oU-nMG8PrigKL_YCgDQ&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=
bentham%20principles%20of%20the%20civil%20code&f=false (characterizing property
as nothing more than the basis of a certain expectation, deriving hereafter certain advantages from a thing which we are already said to possess).
69. Id. at 153 (An attack against one person’s property “excites alarm and distrust in
property owners generally,” while law creates the “encouragement” necessary to the development of industry.). See also LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 59, ch. 5 § 42 (wealth
accrues to the Prince who secures his subjects’ property rights in law and thereby secures
“protection and incouragment [sic] to the honest industry of Mankind”).
70. Bentham, supra note 68, at 143; see also, e.g., id. at 130.
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increases the wealth of all its members71 (even the poorest nonproperty owners).72
A third version of property as a wealth-creating institution adds
division of labor to the foregoing. Property rights, ensured by a
strong third-party guarantor (like the state), provide incentives to
labor. The resulting beneficial increases in productivity are further
multiplied by division of labor and specialization.73 Property thus
enriches the individual property owner; it also enriches the economy of which the individual is a part, a key element in producing
“the wealth of nations.”74 In an influential addendum to this third
version, division of labor may be applied to producing specialized
goods according to a nation’s “comparative advantage.”75 Instead
of accumulating as surplus, that specialized wealth may become a
basis for trade, further enriching individuals and nations.76 This
last version, formulated just after the turn of the nineteenth century, accompanied observation of a shift in property rights and
social change77 in which property plays a role in the emergence or
disappearance of social classes and in political transformation.78
These three versions, despite their differences, come to the common conclusion that property creates wealth, which accrues to
population and sovereign alike. Property supports both private
71. Id. at 148 (“Now, by creating property, the laws have created wealth . . . .”).
72. Id. at 149 (proposing that the protections of property law create wealth for some
and thus improve the lot of all, including those still in humanity’s original condition of
poverty).
73. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, VOL. I, BOOK I, § 1.1.1 (the greatest
improvement in the productive powers of labor are the effects of the division of labor)
[hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS], available at http://www.econlib.org/library/
Smith/smWN1.html#B.I,%20Introduction%20and%20Plan%20of%20the%20Work.
74. Id.
75. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION ch. 19
§ 1 (3d ed. 1821), [hereinafter RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION],
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP5.html#Ch.19,%20
Changes%20in%20the%20Channels%20of%20Trade.
76. See DAVID RICARDO, Preface, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1821), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP1.html#Preface
[hereinafter RICARDO, Preface]. But see, e.g., JOAN ROBINSON, ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1978) (critiquing Ricardo’s theories of comparative advantage and
proposals regarding free trade with historical examination of his example of trade between
England and Portugal).
77. RICARDO, Preface, supra note 76. See generally, JOHN G. GAGLIARDO, ENLIGHTENED
DESPOTISM 39–40, 58–59 (1967) (an old regime of land tenure privileges yielded to a new
production model of rural laborers freed from feudal service and a commerce-rich, landless but monied class looking for investments), cited in Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 4.
78. See Gagliardo, supra note 77, at 341 (loosening feudal holds on land tenure and
increasing alienability of property in land aided “[e]nlightened [d]espots” competing with
traditional landed aristocracies).
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and state spheres; the state secures the private sphere by safeguarding property rights.
3.

The Free-Wheeling Trader

The figure that emerges from the Wealth of Nations account is
the property owner who forms a state to safeguard property interests, the property owner-cum-citizen. Citizens then engage in trading the yields of their properties. The free-market liberalism that
finds some roots in nineteenth-century mercantilism envisions a
role for the state very different in some respects from Libertarianism. Both share an interest in the state staying out of the way; but
while the Rugged Individualist would just as soon the state disappeared, the Free-Wheeling Trader may need the state to safeguard
trade, some of which takes place far outside of local normative
orders or disputing mechanisms.
The Wealth of Nations account outlined here itself encompasses
some positions that would regard each other as intellectual adversaries. However, by the late twentieth century, tensions between a
classical economics of national wealth accumulation versus a freetrade economics—so apparent to David Ricardo in the early nineteenth century—had for many become obscured by larger battles
with other foes. Even within the West, primary fault lines lay not
between Smith and Ricardo, but between Friedman and Keynes.
Rather, former distinctions within classical economics had become
blurred and property, conceptually, had become lumped into one
understanding of what Carol Rose calls “capitalist property rights—
freely acquired, freely traded, divorced from any attachment to
birth or status.”79
C.

The Democracy of Nations Account

In the Liberty of Persons account, property is the basis for a private-sphere refuge from state tyranny, within which private actors
order relations amongst themselves without the state.80 In the
Wealth of Nations account, property is the basis for a wealth-creating private sphere that yields collective enrichment for society and
sovereign.81 Taken to free-trade conclusions, private production
organized around comparative advantage becomes a basis for trade
with other nations, further increasing wealth and collective enrich79. Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 4, at 337.
80. See infra Section I.A.
81. See infra Section I.B.
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ment.82 In the Democracy of Nations account related below, property is still a means, but to a different end: it provides a bulwark
against concentrations of power that thwart a people’s capacity for
self-governance.
1.

Jeffersonian Property Liberty

This account shares a Libertarian concern with combatting tyranny, but here power is not seen as exclusive to the state.83 Wealth
may be a source of power as well. Consequently, the private sphere
is not only a possible space of resistance against tyranny; with concentrations of wealth, it too may be a source of threat to citizen
self-governance. The existence of private property as such is not
sufficient to safeguard democratic processes.
This conceptualization of power and risk leads to some programmatic implications. A legal framework supporting private property
rights is necessary but not sufficient. The actual arrangement of
property also matters.84 The “negative” part of this program is that
property should not be concentrated in the hands of a few. Concentrations of property could yield concentrations of wealth used
to influence democratic deliberations, sway governance processes,
or control state offices. The “positive” part of this program is that
property distributed among small-holders can reinforce the potential for self-governance by providing a base for economic self-suffi82. See infra Section I.B.2.
83. For the view of a representative early radical Jeffersonian, see, e.g., Michael Lieb,
Medical Doctor of Philadelphia and Advocate of Republican Government, AURORA (Nov. 2, 1801)
(under despotism, people’s property, liberty, and lives are held “by courtesy,” not by law),
cited in Andrew Shankman, Malcontents and Tertium Quids: The Battle to Define Democracy in
Jeffersonian Philadelphia, 19 J. OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 43, 46 (1999).
84. To take just one famous example, Jefferson worked to divorce bloodline from
land holding by trying to abolish the fee tail in the United States. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A
HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 81–82, 90 (2d ed. 1986). Fee tail was an inheritable estate in
land that could not be alienated in fee simple by the present possessory interest holder
(the “tenant in tail”). See id. It passed at death to the heir in tail, typically by primogeniture. See id. If the bloodline died out, absent remaindermen, the reversion interest determined present possessory interest meaning that at that point rights in land reverted to the
grantor (or, more likely, grantor’s heir) in fee simple. See id. See also J. OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES OF VA. [Oct. 7–Dec. 21, 1776] at 13, 23 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd 1821)
(reporting that Jefferson presented the bill to abolish fee tail in Virginia), cited in Hart, Fee
Tail, supra note 46, at 168 n.4; THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 68–69 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1892)
(asserting the importance of abolishing fee tail and counting the Virginia legislation
among his foremost achievements), cited in Hart, Fee Tail, supra note 46, at 168 n.4; Act of
Oct. 1776, ch. XXVI, 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA 226 (William Waller Hening, ed., Richmond, Va., J. & G. Cochran 1821) (abolishing fee tail), cited in Hart, Fee Tail, supra note 46, at 167 n.1.
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ciency and thus resistance to wealthy or politically powerful
interveners. This view of the relationship between property and
political community, wherein the goal is the Democracy of Nations
over the Wealth of Nations, is most famously associated with
Thomas Jefferson.85
2.

Property, Subsistence, and Civic Virtue

Jefferson relies on property to furnish the property-owning citizen with subsistence. Economic self-sufficiency in turn provides
the possibility of citizens independent from the pressure of wealthier or larger interests during deliberations required of democratic
self-governance. Land ownership does not accomplish all that Jefferson expects of property. Land use plays a role as well. Jefferson’s contemporaries observe traditional agricultural production
in Britain giving way to three new classes: land owner, agricultural
laborer, and (potentially landless but monied) commercial investor.86 That sort of alienation does not suit Jefferson’s purposes.
His account connects political economy with moral economy. For
Jefferson, land use plays a role in the formation of citizens adequate to a functioning democracy. “Cultivators of the earth are the
most valuable citizens,”87 he asserts, again and again.88 Property
ownership in land forges lasting bonds to a nation in a time of
emigration, immigration, nation-building, loyalty, and betrayal.89
It is not agricultural land in its symbolic capacity that most captures
Jefferson’s imagination, however. In his view, the activity of farming instills a prized kind of civic virtue.90 Agriculturalist landown85. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR
(1955).
86. See Ricardo, Preface, supra note 76; for an influential treatment, see also Charles A.
Beard, Some Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, 19 AM. HIST. REV. 282, 298 (1914)
(characterizing the split between Hamilton’s Federalists and Jefferson’s Republicans in
Congress as “a clear case of a collision of economic interests: fluid capital versus
agrarianism.”).
87. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Aug. 23, 1785), in WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 818 [hereinafter JEFFERSON, Letter to Jay], cited in Michael Hardt, Jefferson and Democracy, 59 AM. Q. 41, 54 (2007) [hereinafter Hardt, Jefferson and Democracy].
88. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Response to Query XIX, The Present State of Manufactures, Commerce, Interior and Exterior Trade?, in NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787
(1781)) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu
/18th_century/jeffvir.asp (“Those who labour [sic] in the earth are the chosen people of
God, if ever he had a chosen people”).
89. JEFFERSON, Letter to Jay, supra note 87 (cultivators are “tied to their country &
wedded to it’s [sic] liberty & interests by the most lasting bonds.”).
90. Id. (affirming farmers are “the most vigorous, the most independent, the most
virtuous” citizens).
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ers are a repository for “genuine virtue” because they “look up to
heaven, to their own soil and industry” for subsistence.91
The alternatives suffer by comparison. In Europe, lands are
“locked up against the cultivator” because of scarcity of arable land
or because of local monopolies on ownership.92 The resulting
unemployment might reasonably lead European political economists like Smith to preach manufacture; but with different land
tenure regime and population density America is freed to construct a system of land ownership that fosters the moral character
of a citizenry necessary for democracy. Those who labor in manufacturing depend on the “casualties and caprice of customers.”93
“Dependance [sic] begets subservience and venality, suffocates the
germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.”94 These are not qualities of citizens fit for self-governance.
His writings to Washington betray skepticism of a Ricardian economy based on trade as well.95 In aggregate, the health of a citizenry can be measured by the proportion engaged in agriculture.96
It is this anthropology—an understanding of human nature that
construes a causal relationship between land ownership, the selfsufficiency of subsistence agriculture, and a resultant civic virtue—
and its sociological conclusions that take Jefferson to a theory of
government and political economy. He fears the nation’s dependence on a raw-materials export economy less than he fears the
loss of the individual’s self-sufficiency and economic independence
that a manufacturing economy would bring about. “[L]et our
work-shops remain in Europe. It is better to carry provisions and
materials to workmen there, than bring them to the provisions and
materials, and with them their manners and principles.”97
Despite his totemic status in U.S. history, Jefferson’s economic
views are out of fashion. This is not only because of repugnance at
the contradiction between his views on property, virtue, and
democracy and his own practices in using enslaved labor to cultivate his agricultural land. In addition, today Jefferson’s calls for an
91. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 88. Jefferson wrote his “Notes on the
State of Virginia” as an analytical response to queries from a French interlocutor in which
he explains natural resources and political economy of his corner the new world. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Letter to George Washington (Aug. 14, 1787), available
at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0040.
96. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 88.
97. Id.
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economy based on extraction, agriculture, and export of raw
materials versus manufacturing and commerce look like the basis
of what is now called “underdeveloped” versus “developed” economies.98 In economic development his opponent Alexander Hamilton is cited today as having anticipated a future course of American
capitalism.99 However, in their own time, rivals did not reduce the
Republican-Federalist debates to a dispute over economic production. Their views differ in political theory, sociology, and anthropology: over the plausibility of different forms of representative
government, the kind of social structure required for it, and the
kind of persons who would make the citizens demanded of that
society and government.
Jefferson does not claim that this program promises greatest efficiency. His eye is on a higher prize. “The loss by the transportation of commodities across the Atlantic will be made up in
happiness and permanence of government.”100 His calculation is
based on the “spirit of a people” required for a healthy democracy.
Neither wealth itself, nor a tyranny-restraining constitution, nor
wise legislation are enough to preserve the republic. “It is the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic in vigour
[sic]. A degeneracy in these is a canker which soon eats to the
heart of its laws and constitution.”101
3.

The Self-Sufficient Citizen

The central figure of the Democracy of Nations account is the
Self-Sufficient Citizen, yeoman-farmer, autarkic, unencumbered by
dependency and immunized against wealthier or more powerful
influences. Small-holding agriculture offers the self-sufficiency
that protects against the tyrant and his state as well as against the
oligarch and his manipulations of wealth.102 Just as importantly in
Jefferson’s view, it cultivates a certain independence of character
that a democracy requires in its citizens.
98. Hardt, Jefferson and Democracy, supra note 87.
99. Id. at 54.
100. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, supra note 88.
101. Id.
102. C. B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 135 (1973) (in Jeffersonian thought,
small property defies subservience and guarantees against government tyranny and economic oppression), cited in Hardt, Jefferson and Democracy, supra note 87, at 57 n.18. For
critique of Jefferson’s “reactionary utopia” of agrarianism, see MANFREDO TAFURI, ARCHITECTURE AND UTOPIA (BarbaraLuigia LaPenta, trans., 1979), cited in Hardt, Jefferson and
Democracy, supra note 87, at 54 n.16.
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Jeffersonian economic theory had long lost currency with U.S.
legal theorists by the end of the twentieth century, yielding to preoccupations with increasing wealth or maximizing utility.
Although not in vogue as economic theory, though, Jeffersonian
documents and the liberties they espouse figure in the celebratory
atmospherics at the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of
the Union behind the Iron Curtain. At that time, too, in U.S.
scholarship and policy advising to Eastern European governments,
a Jefferson presumption of a relationship between property owner
and model citizen resurfaces, I propose, sometimes explicitly103
and sometimes implicitly.104
D.

Legal Thought on the Eve of Engagement

In this section I identify several accounts in Western legal scholars’ intellectual repertoire as they faced the challenges of the postSoviet moment. As different as these accounts are from each
other, they share some commonalities. In each, property—a feature of a private sphere—plays a distinctive role in the constitution
of political community, the ordering of social relations in a certain
kind of public sphere. The central figure emerging from each
account is the figure of the private property owner, imagined as an
individual. Property is the setting for a private sphere; it creates
wealth or self-sufficiency, either enriching the nation or empowering individuals to create self-governance.
This material also highlights major questions, dating at least to
the founding of the U.S. republic, still left unresolved. Is property
the basis for a private sphere that is an indispensible space for
political associations below the radar of the state or source of concentrations of wealth that add one more threat to citizen self-governance? Does property bring empowering self-sufficiency or
disempowering differences in wealth? New questions arise: How
would the Self-Sufficient Citizen fare in a time of modern industrialized agriculture and economies of scale? Finally, while the traditions upon which these accounts draw do attend to the
practicalities of citizen self-governance, in their late twentieth-century versions broadcast to former socialist states, democracy is surprisingly underexplained. Is democracy merely a matter of how
rulers are selected, amounting to holding free and fair elections?
103. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 13.
104. See infra Section II.C.
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Or is democracy a matter of citizen self-rule, and if so, what would
that specifically look like in today’s world?
With these accounts furnishing explanations, informing conscious critique and subconscious expectation, Western property
theorists viewed a landscape newly revealed with the raising of the
iron curtain. Section II explores features of that exposed landscape. It describes property in Marxist theory, Soviet doctrine, and
socialist practice, an alternative account and history from which a
different figure emerges. Western critique of Soviet practice,
based on Western intellectual histories, gave rise to diagnosis of a
property problem and a property solution for the post-Soviet condition. Some results of the encounter between Western ideas and
post-Soviet experience are reported in Sections III and IV.

1.

II.

DIAGNOSIS

A.

Constructing a Collective

AND

REMEDY

Marxist Theory, Soviet Doctrine

Socialism is, in important part, also a set of ideas about how
property regime effects social relations and belief systems. Rose’s
“standard story” that property creates wealth105 is not the one told
here. Instead, classical Marxism identifies private property as the
mechanism that turns laborers into proletarians, the cause of
exploitation under capitalism, and the key element of a capitalist
mode of production.106 With the abolition of private property a
central tenet of Bolshevik doctrine, the legal status of property was
central to the Soviet Socialist project from its beginnings.107 As
one of its first acts, the Soviet government redistributed crown and
church estates to local peasants.108 Eradicating private ownership
105. Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 4. See also infra Section II.B.2 (discussing three
versions of property as wealth-creating institution).
106. See, e.g., 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL ch. 32, The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation (Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling, trans., 1887), available at http://www.marxists.org/
archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch32.htm.
107. See, e.g., Decree of All-Russian Central Executive Committee, On Socialist Land
Reform and on Measures Leading to Socialist Farming, Sobr. Uzakon. i Rasporiazh. RKP
RSFSR [Collection of the Laws and Orders of the Worker-Peasant Government of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], 1919, No. 4, Item 43 (reaffirming, shortly after
the revolution, intention to outlaw individual types of farming and setting collective land
use as the destination for Soviet law and policy), reprinted in IDEAS AND FORCES IN SOVIET
LEGAL HISTORY 118 (Zigurds L. Zile ed., 1992) [hereinafter Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY]; see
also VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, Otvet na zapros krest’ianina [Reply to a Peasant’s Inquiry], in
POLNOE SOBRANIE SOCHINENII [Complete Collection of Essays], 1953 (1919).
108. See Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets Decree “On Land,” Sobr. Uzakon. i
Rasporiazh. RKP [Collection of the Laws and Orders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Gov-
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in all agricultural lands, including small peasant holdings, began
with mass collectivization a decade later.109
By the end of the Soviet period, Soviet law had erected a hierarchy in which property at each level enjoyed a different extent of
legal protection. The more accessible to the public or reciprocal
the relations between users, the higher in the hierarchy a category
stood. At the top, “state socialist property” included property specifically owned by the state, all land, and all natural resources. It
could not be used as security and was inalienable.110 It was followed by “cooperative property,” a kind of restricted-use commons,
belonging indivisibly to a distinct group of citizens.111 At the bottom of the hierarchy, “personal property” served personal needs
and included single-family apartments or houses, dachi (vacation
cottages), furniture, clothes, and cars.112 (Ownership of a house or
dacha did not include the land under the building. Translating
into Anglo-American terms, we could say roughly that Soviet law
lacked fixtures doctrine and treated buildings more like personalty
than realty.)113 Personal property was the only freely transferable
property, but its use for profit-making activities was largely outlawed.114 Presumptions of legal protection were reversed from
those in the West: the more private the claim, the less legal protection it enjoyed. In other words, the lower a property type stood in
the hierarchy, the more vulnerable a particular holding was to confiscation, regulation, taxation, or counter-claim. The category of
private property was abolished altogether.115 Productive assets
were “state property, i.e. the common property of the Soviet
people.”116
Under this schema two entities were allowed to hold agricultural
land: the state farm (sovkhoz), in which land and capital equipment
belonged to the state, and the collective farm (kolkhoz), a restrictedernment] 1917–1918, No. 1, Item 3, reprinted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 107,
at 116–17.
109. See infra Section II.A.2.a.
110. See VICTOR P. MOZOLIN, PROPERTY LAW IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 10 (1993) [hereinafter MOZOLIN, PROPERTY LAW].
111. W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 178–79 (1983) [hereinafter BUTLER, SOVIET LAW].
112. See MOZOLIN, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 110, at 10–11.
113. See F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, RUSSIAN LAW: THE END OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE
ROLE OF LAW 229–46 (1993).
114. See BUTLER, SOVIET LAW, supra note 111, at 174.
115. See Heller, Anti-Commons, supra note 13, at 628–29.
116. KONST. SSSR (1977) [USSR CONSTITUTION], art. 11 (“State property, i.e. the common property of the Soviet people, is the principal form of socialist property. The land, its
minerals, waters, and forests are the exclusive property of the state. The state owns the
basic means of production in industry, construction, and agriculture . . . .”).
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use commons to which the collective held title and in which userights to the land and equipment belonged indivisibly to the workers.117 Resident workers on a state farm were wage laborers with
steady income.118 Members of a kolkhoz, working collectively-held
property, were subject to risks of weather, pests, disease, and other
exogenous hazards of agricultural production. Insiders felt the difference. Neither state farms nor collective farms could legally sell
land.119 Although a barter market in equipment and unauthorized
land use did arise, bargaining was curtailed by central planners’
control over allocation of inputs and price of outputs.120
This difference in lived experience between state and collective
farm is one point where assumptions embedded in Western property scholarship obfuscate an important distinction, giving rise to
blind spots or misunderstanding. Much of Western scholarship
neglects the category of “state property.” Harold Demsetz gives just
a one-sentence definition in his theory of property.121 Others do
not think it warrants even that122 or elide state property with the
category of collectively-held property.123
For our analysis, we retain separate categories of state and collective property for several reasons, the first being ethnographic accuracy.124 The old de jure distinction between state and collective
ownership survives into the present in some rural practices, pat117. See Model Collective Farm Charter, 10 Spravochnik Partinogo Rabotnika (“Handbook
of the Party Worker”) 175 (1970), cited in Donald D. Barry, The Spravochnik Partinogo
Rabotnika as a Source of Party Law, in RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THEIR STATUS UNDER
LAW 37, 45 (Dietrich A. Loeber ed., 1986).
118. See MERLE FAINSOD, HOW RUSSIA IS RULED (1967).
119. See C.P.W., Collective Farming in the U.S.S.R.: Post-War Consolidation of Control, 470,
470–71 IV THE WORLD TODAY (Nov. 1948) [hereinafter Collective Farming in the U.S.S.R.].
120. See, e.g., id. at 475–76
121. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354
(1967) [hereinafter Demsetz, Property Theory] (“State ownership implies that the state may
exclude anyone from the use of a right as long as the state follows accepted political procedures for determining who may not use state-owned property.”).
122. See, e.g., Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1322 (1992–93)
[hereinafter Ellickson, Property in Land] (querying why Demsetz singles out the state as a
different form of ownership entity and asserting when government acts in a proprietary
role as a land manager, it shares attributes with a nongovernmental group with a constituency of comparable size).
123. Although Dagan and Heller admit the state has a special status, in the end they
come around to something like Ellickson’s position dismissing the category of state property, surmising since demise of socialism, it has so lost importance as to warrant dropping it
from the previous normalized trilogy of property categories (private, commons, and state).
See Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 558 (2000–01)
[hereinafter Dagan & Heller, Liberal Commons].
124. Even when all agricultural land in post-Soviet Ukraine had been converted to collective ownership, it took specific legal measures to extinguish state ownership. See infra
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terns of relationships, epistemology, and expectations. A second
reason pertains to its analytic utility. The category of “state property” foregrounds a peculiar owner/manager enjoying unusual
authority to tax, regulate, and exercise powers of eminent
domain.125 These peculiar powers of regulation – including the
capacity to criminalize certain uses or users – belong singularly to
the state and hold particular explanatory power. (We do this
understanding that “the state” itself is not an unproblematic or
simple category, standing for decidedly varied forms of organization and practice.) The state actually occupies two positions in our
property analytic: in the analytic category of property owner, theoretically positioned the same as other owners but in practice
endowed with different levers of power, and at the same time in a
separate category that subsumes others, as the institutional setting
in which all other property is held. These distinctions may seem
like splitting hairs until we need to analyze situations of public-private overlap or oligarchy. Finally, we preserve the conceptual category because compared with state property, collective property has
several distinct features. Collective property most closely approximates Demsetz’s category of communal ownership,126 for reasons
of scale its management often subject to relations that are, in
Nader’s term, face-to-face as opposed to face-to-faceless.127 The
nature of the group also matters. Collectively-held property supports forms of the self and the social not based primarily on state
forms of selfhood (like, for example, citizenship), sociability (for
example, bureaucratic indifference),128 or ethical systems predicated on state values (like, for example, patriotism). Quality as
well as quantity of in-group relationships make a difference regarding managing a shared resource; the state/collective distinction
captures some of those qualitative differences.
Marxist theory and Soviet legal doctrine create a framework for
action. That action, i.e. implementation of theory and doctrine, is
briefly described in the next section in order to describe the landSection IV.A. (describing legal measures to abolish state farms and convert them into collective farms).
125. See Ellickson, Property in Land, supra note 122, at 1322.
126. Demsetz, Property Theory, supra note 121, at 354.
127. See Laura Nader, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS 11, 55, 172
(2002). See also Laura Nader, A User Theory of Law as Applied to Gender, in THE NEBRASKA
SYMPOSIUM IN MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT (1985) (arguing that
development of the law is driven by plaintiffs and explaining that differences of scale and
density of social relations matter in that project).
128. For exploration of bureaucratic indifference as a feature of the modern state, see
MICHAEL HERZFELD, THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF INDIFFERENCE (1993).
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scape and legacies they created upon which Western property theories would later be brought to bear.
2.

Socialist Practice

a.

Collectivization as Destruction

Establishing collective land ownership in Ukraine after the
Soviet Revolution entailed two steps. The first step, what is commonly termed “collectivization” in the West, involved destruction
of the previous land tenure system and elimination of a relatively
well-off (in a context of poverty) rural demographic group, the socalled “kulaks.”129 Between December 1927130 and March 1930,131
Party and government leaders first urged,132 then directed, rural
households to form collective farms.133 In parallel, authorities
hardened their stance towards kulaks. Initially singled out for economic isolation,134 kulaks became the target of “‘liquidation’ as a
class,” a campaign that chillingly became known as “dekulakiza129. “Kulak” was a subjective term, designating relatively better off rural smallholders.
How prosperous a person needed to be to be considered a kulak depended on how poor
his or her neighbors were: in one village, owning draft animals could make one a kulak
while in another, merely owning a pig might be sufficient. Judgment was local; during
collectivization, village committees of poor peasants were to draw up lists of local “kulaks.”
Monica E. Eppinger, Reforming the Nation: Law and Land in Post-Soviet Ukraine (2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkley).
130. See Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) stenographic record 56 (1928) [hereinafter Fifteenth Congress], cited in WAR AGAINST THE PEASANTRY, 1927–1930, VOLUME 1: THE TRAGEDY OF THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE 386 n. 24 (Lynne
Viola et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Viola, TRAGEDY OF THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE].
131. See I.V. Stalin, Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective Farm Movement,
PRAVDA, Mar. 2, 1930, at 2.
132. See Viola, Introduction to Chapter 3, The Great Turn, 4 May 1929 – 15 November 1929,
in Viola, TRAGEDY OF THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 130, at 122 (only 1.7% of peasant
households voluntarily joining in the first six months).
133. See Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party “On the Pace of
Collectivization and State Assistance to Collective-Farm Construction,” January 5, 1930,
KPSS V RESOLUTSIAKH I RESHENIAKH S’EZDOV, KONFERENTSIAKH, I PLENUMOV TSK [THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF MEETINGS, CONFERENCES, AND PLENUMS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE], VOL. 5, 72–75 (declaring “wholesale”
collectivization of no less than 75% of a every village), reprinted in Viola, TRAGEDY OF THE
SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 130, at 201–03.
134. Decree of USSR Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars “On Collective Farms,” Sobr. Zakon. i Rasporiazh. RKP SSSR [Collection of Laws
and Orders of the Worker-Peasant Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]
1927, No. 15, Item 161 (excluding kulaks from purchasing agricultural machinery on
favorable terms, forbidding “pseudo-cooperatives” of kin). See also Fifteenth Congress,
supra note 130, at 60 (Stalin advocating “economic measures” to limit the “the known
growth of the kulak” in December 1927 at the Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party).
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tion.”135 Between January and March of 1930, Party leaders in Moscow sent urban members and local agents to confiscate kulak
property and summarily execute, incarcerate into concentration
camps or exile kulak owners, and resettle any survivors on small
plots excluded from the new collectives.136 Dekulakization fell particularly hard on Ukraine. The authorizing decree set quotas for
concentration camp incarceration and exile per republic, with the
quota for Ukraine two to six times higher than for all other
regions.137 Between exhortation of rural households and dekulakization, the portion of collectivized farmland in Ukraine rose
from 16% to 64% in three months.138
Dekulakization depopulated pockets of the countryside. For
those left behind, an ominous indicator of worse times to come
initially went largely unnoticed: the first socialized farms, expected
to provide only 12.7% of national grain demand under the 1929
agricultural plan, fell short even of that modest goal.139 In 1931,
crop yields fell dramatically, but unbelieving Soviet authorities continued to order aggressive grain confiscation even though farmers
did not have a surplus.140 By spring 1932, some peasants were
already too hungry to work in the fields.141 By summer, Ukrainian
peasants were committing suicide to avoid starvation and the Soviet
secret police (the KGB-predecessor Obyedinyonnoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye (OGPU)) was sending scattered reports of cannibalism back to Moscow.142 While thousands
135. See Politburo Decree “On Measures for the Liquidation of Kulak Farms in Raions
of Wholesale Collectivization,” Jan. 30, 1930 (Russian Government Archive of Social and
Political History f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, ll. 64–69), reprinted in Viola, TRAGEDY OF THE SOVIET
COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 130, at 228–34.
136. Id.
137. See id. (targeting 15,000 Ukrainians for concentration camps and 30-35,000 for
exile as kulaks).
138. See id.
139. See R.W. DAVIES, THE SOCIALIST OFFENSIVE: THE COLLECTIVIZATION OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE 1929–1930, 104–05 (1980).
140. See The 1931 Grain Harvest, in R.W. DAVIES AND STEPHEN G. WHEATCROFT, THE
YEARS OF HUNGER: SOVIET AGRICULTURE, 1931–1933 48–78 (2004). On food security in the
U.S.S.R., see generally ELENA OSOKINA, OUR DAILY BREAD: SOCIALIST DISTRIBUTION AND THE
ART OF SURVIVAL IN STALIN’S RUSSIA, 1927–1941 (Kate Transchel ed. & trans., Greta Bucher
Trans., 2001) (abridged and edited version of Elena Osokina, ZA FASADOM “STALINSKOGO
IZOBILIIA”: RASPREDELENIE I RYNOK V SNABZHENII NASELENIIA V GODY INDUSTRIALIZATSII
1927–1941 63–64 (1999).
141. See generally Lynne Viola, Introduction, in VIOLA, TRAGEDY OF THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 130, at 1–20.
142. See, e.g., “Cases of Cannibalism in Uman district, Kiev Region,” Special Communication of Deputy Head of the Ukrainian GPU, January 28, 1932, TsDAGOU [Central Government Archive of Civil Organizations [Unities] of Ukraine] f. 1, op. 20, l. 6274, 32; Kiev
GPU Report March 12, 1932, in HOLOD, 1932–33 (Kiev, 1990) 433–37; GPU Report from
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of kulaks had been killed and tens of thousands more exiled during collectivization, the worst losses during the destructive phase of
Ukrainian collectivization came from hunger.
In Sen’s analysis, famine causes death either by food availability
decline [FAD] (a net loss of foodstuffs available to a consumer) or
food entitlement decline [FED] (wherein food exists but hungry
people’s access to it has declined to starvation levels).143 Ukrainian
villagers in 1931–1933 certainly suffered from food availability
decline, as harvests faltered from dislocation of hundreds of
thousands, the violent interruptions of collectivization, and the loss
of managerial expertise and normative order from dekulakization.
More, however, died from food entitlement decline, from policy
decisions in Moscow to strip the Ukrainian countryside of grain to
export or to feed urban workers. Of a Soviet Ukrainian population
of 33 million, a minimum estimate of 3.5 million starved to death
between 1932 and 1933.144 Within two harvests of decollectivization, a minimum of 10% of the total population of Soviet Ukraine
had perished.145
Thus “collectivization” in Ukraine typically refers to a brief, catastrophic three-year period of change in rural land ownership
between 1929–1932 at the cost of more than 10% of the rural population. These general outlines of the destructive phase of Ukrainian collectivization, familiar to U.S. thinkers, influenced their
interpretation of the Soviet experience and post-Soviet reform.
However, collectivization in its overtly destructive phase was only
the first step. In rural Soviet Ukrainian experience, “collectivization” in its constructive phase continued over the subsequent five
decades.
Dnipropetrovsk, March 5, 1932, in HOLOD, 1932–33 409 (Kiev, 1990); Report of Information and Sowing Group of Ukrainian Party Central Committee, April 1, 1933, in HOLOD,
1932–33 480–81 (Kiev, 1990); all discussed in R.W. DAVIES & STEPHEN G. WHEATCROFT, THE
YEARS OF HUNGER: SOVIET AGRICULTURE, 1931–1933 421–22 (2004).
143. See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION (1981).
144. Total registered deaths (which likely reflects under-reporting) for 1931–33 in
Ukraine is 3,091,809, reflected against an estimated 1930 population of 28,710,628. See
R.W. Davies’ latest calculation at www.soviet-archives-research.co.uk/hunger. Davies and
Wheatcroft, adjusting for statistical birth and death rates, add to the death toll an estimated 1.54 million “excess deaths,” i.e. people who died from famine who would not otherwise have died at that time, in 1932–1933 alone in Ukraine. See R.W. DAVIES AND
STEPHEN G. WHEATCROFT, THE YEARS OF HUNGER: SOVIET AGRICULTURE, 1931–1933 415
(2004).
145. See generally HUNGER BY DESIGN: THE GREAT UKRAINIAN FAMINE AND ITS SOVIET CONTEXT (Halyna Hryn ed., 2008).
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Collectivization as Construction

As James Scott observes, collectivization ordered rural populations in such a way that they became visible to the state.146 It also
re-ordered agricultural production with profound effects on political community locally.147 Collective farms were to operate as a
unit, not merely as an agglomeration of lands held in group ownership. And so, after its violent inception, another extraordinary
movement is associated with Soviet collectivization: building a
modern collective life. Here I highlight just a few measures—
application of science; standardization; division of labor; specialization; and industrialization—that transformed collectivized farms
and labor:
Science: To facilitate the application of science to agricultural
work, the Soviet government began with the basics, introducing
mass literacy148 through new institutions like the “rural reading
room”149 for volunteers to teach adult reading or disseminate
information inter alia on agricultural science.150 Learning to read
became not merely a personal pursuit, but a “social task,”151 creating readerships through which common bodies of scientific knowledge circulated.152
146. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 203 (1998) (the Soviet state’s “great achievement” in collectivization was “to take a social and economic terrain singularly unfavorable
to appropriation and control and to create institutional forms and production units far
better adapted to monitoring, managing, appropriating, and controlling from above”).
147. Contra SCOTT, id. at 202–03 (alleging Soviet collectivized agriculture was an “evident failure” in raising grain production, creating “new men and women” in the countryside, or abolishing cultural difference between country and city).
148. Before collectivization, an “army” of twelve million illiterates had blocked agricultural development because the troops could not read the latest scientific literature on
farming methods. See 3 RABOTNIK PROSVESHCHENIIA [WORKER OF ENLIGHTENMENT] 22–23
(1926), cited in CHARLES E. CLARK, UPROOTING OTHERNESS: THE LITERACY CAMPAIGN IN NEPERA RUSSIA 131 (2000) [hereinafter WORKER OF ENLIGHTENMENT].
149. I. KUZ’MIN, KAK ORGANIZIROVAT’ I POSTAVIT’ RABOTU IZBY-CHITAL’NI [HOW TO
ORGANIZE AND SET TO WORK A RURAL READING ROOM] 54–55 (1926), cited in CHARLES E.
CLARK, UPROOTING OTHERNESS: THE LITERACY CAMPAIGN IN NEP-ERA RUSSIA 118 (2000).
150. See, e.g., WORKER OF ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 148 (instructing and encouraging
volunteers in early rural literacy campaigns of the 1920s).
151. Editorial introduction to Nadezhda Krupskaya’s “The Organization of Self-Study,” in
N.K. KRUPSKAYA, PEDAGOGICHESKIE SOCHINENIE V SHESTI TOMAKH, TOM VTOROI [PEDAGOGICAL ESSAYS IN SIX VOLUMES, VOL. II] 418 (trans. my own, Pedagogika, 1978) (“[D]eveloping
socialist society and scientific-technical revolution” demands “constantly renewing the
knowledge of every member of society” which itself is “an important social task.”).
152. For an analysis of some effects of creating a reading public, see generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF
NATIONALISM (2006).
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Standardization: Training sessions standardized agricultural
techniques within and across farming communities.153 “Comrades’
courts” provided a forum where fellow farmworkers could reinforce norms of “tempo, quality, and quality control,” i.e., mutually
monitor standardization.154 Widespread adoption of mechanized
farming – produced in a limited range of models – reproduced
standardization in material culture, from the width of crop rows to
the size of milk bottles.
Division of labor and specialization155: A grass-roots campaign,
the Stakhanovite movement156, applied Taylorist methods157 to
increase productivity. Borrowing from a movement that began in
Ukrainian coal mining and heavy industry, rural Stakhanovites
strove to bring rigorous self-discipline, mechanization, division of
labor, and specialized knowledge to fellow collective farm workers.158 Such efforts sought to divide up agricultural tasks and train
peasants accordingly, creating specialized workers per task. This
division of labor recalls Durkheim159 more than Ricardo,160 functioning as a source of social solidarity rather than comparative
advantage.
Enduring legacies of the collectivized countryside resulting from
socialist legal doctrine and policy, then, include rural veneration of
scientific learning, interest in cutting-edge “best practices,” and a
scientific division of labor aimed at maximizing individual efficien153. Reading itself is a technology of standardization, of course.
154. See, e.g., 9–10 Za tempy, kachestvo, proverku [For tempo, quality, and quality control] 35
(1933), photo reportage reprinted in OLEG KHARKHORDIN, THE COLLECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL
IN RUSSIA: A STUDY OF PRACTICES 281 (1999) [hereinafter KHARKHORDIN, COLLECTIVE AND
THE INDIVIDUAL].
155. For description of collective farms patterned on the labor practices of heavy industry, see R.W. DAVIES, THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA, VOL. 2, THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM, 1929–1930 (1980); SHEILA FITZPATRICK, STALIN’S PEASANTS (1994).
156. See, e.g., LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM, STAKHANOVISM AND THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTIVITY
IN THE U.S.S.R, 1935–1941 (1988).
157. For the importance of Taylor in Soviet modernization practices, see, e.g.,
Nadezhda Krupskaya, The Organization of Self-Study, CHTO CHITAT’ I CHEMU UCHIT’SYA,
[WHAT TO READ AND WHY TO STUDY] (1922), reprinted in N.K. KRUPSKAYA, PEDAGOGICHESKIE
SOCHINENIE V SHESTI TOMAKH, TOM VTOROI [PEDAGOGICAL ESSAYS IN SIX VOLUMES, VOL. I]
132, 132 nn.1, 132 and nn.4, 5, 7, 8, 11 (1978) (by Lenin’s widow and an influential Party
activist; citing as models pragmatist William James, and Frederick Taylor, the American
engineer who conceived a system for maximizing efficiency during the workday).
158. See, e.g., MARY BUCKLEY, MOBILIZING SOVIET PEASANTS: HEROINES AND HEROES OF
STALIN’S FIELDS 115, 119 (2006) (“Stakhanovites had a duty to share information on better
performance in order to boost food production.”).
159. See Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (1893).
160. See RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION, supra note 75, ch.
19 § 1.
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cies in group organization through specialization, routinization,
and spatial arrangements. The collective farm became organized
much like an urban factory than a collection of Jeffersonian yeoman-individualists. Collectivization throughout the Soviet economy intensified in the late 1950s.161 On farms, a new
administrative organ, the “link,” united existing primary labor
units into a single group of agricultural brigades, its mission to
coordinate all stages of the production process.162 Interbrigade
“peer pressure,” horizontal surveillance, reduced the need for
external discipline, since each brigade’s take depended on the
price that the whole “link” received for its final product.163 As the
1977 Soviet Constitution declared, as a matter of law, “A programme [sic] is being consistently implemented in the USSR to
convert agricultural work into a variety of industrial work, to
extend the network of educational, cultural, and medical institutions, and of trade, public catering, service and public utility facilities in rural localities . . . .”164
Collectivization of landholding165 initiated a profound transformation. Villagers still, for the most part, occupied separate cottages cultivating small kitchen gardens for personal consumption
as villagers had previously; but fields were radically transformed by
agglomeration.166 Economies of scale, the introduction of industrial agriculture, mechanization, and vast application of fertilizers
and pesticides became the rule. Long after lands were pooled,
“collectivization” meant forging a modern industrial enterprise of
161. See Karl Eugen Wadekin, The Private Sector in Soviet Agriculture (2d ed. 1973),
cited in KHARKHORDIN, COLLECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 154, at 281.
162. See GEORGE BRESLAUER, KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV AS LEADERS 88–101 (1982)
Khrushchev attempted to increase agricultural production and modernize the countryside
via state investments in agricultural machinery and mineral fertilizer production. Id. at 92,
96. Simultaneously, he concentrated on rationalizing the organization of labor, intensifying pressure on local cadres, and initiating “anti-parasite” campaigns to boost production.
Id. at 88, 89, 94. Efforts to modernize and increase socialist agricultural production
between 1961–1964 culminate in his support for a program of decentralization of managerial initiative combined with increased accountability for worker productivity, the “link”
(zvenevaya) system. Id. at 101.
163. For description of “links” and further literature on them, see GEORGE BRESLAUER,
KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV AS LEADERS 101–04 (1982). See also KHARKHORDIN, supra note
154, at 281–82 (describing the “link” system in the context of building collective
subjectivity).
164. KONST. SSSR art. 22.
165. See infra Section II.A.2.a.
166. Agglomeration of many small parcels from individual farmers in a given area into
one collectively held farm or state farm resulted, naturally, in larger parcels. Larger parcels are more suited to industrial farming, mechanization, and the applications of science,
standardization, and specialization. See supra notes 150–162.
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farmers marked by specialization, division of labor, and the inculcation of mutual responsibility for the finished product. In short,
legal doctrine created collective landholding and collectivizing
landholding was an initial step towards creating a collectivized
workforce. Oleg Kharkhordin refers to this new entity by its transliteration from Russian, a “kollektiv,” collective both in material
organization of life and in consciousness.167
3.

Community and Kollektiv

Conventional Western property doctrine embeds the idea of
community in collective ownership.168 There are political implications, even when a group is not specified as a political community;
communal ownership involves policing ontological boundaries,
determining insider and outsider status through the idiom of use
or control: “Communal ownership means that the community
denies to the state or to individual citizens the right to interfere
with any person’s exercise of community-owned rights.”169 Dagan
and Heller make community implicit in distinguishing a commons
from an open-access resource,170 a commons being specifically
“owned or controlled by a finite number of people who manage the
resource together and exclude outsiders.”171 The state or collective farm of the Ukrainian countryside was, in this respect, a commons. While post-socialist land privatization targets collectivelyheld land, community is its collateral object.
To designate the user community of the sovkhoz of the kolkhoz,
Kharkhordin’s term kollektiv serves well.172 A kollektiv is meant to be
a form of organization of experience with a particular material
basis, set up for the purpose of cultivating a certain forms of sociability, identity, and personhood.173 Referencing the insights of
Soviet Ukrainian educator A.S. Makarenko, Kharkhordin observes,
“if one forms a kollektiv, one also forms a specific individual;
engendering kollektiv and lichnost’ [personality] are two sides of the
167. KHARKHORDIN, COLLECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 154, at 77.
168. See, e.g., Demsetz, Property Theory, supra note 121, at 354 (“Communal ownership”
means “a right which can be exercised by all members of the community.”). For a reconsideration of the concept of community, see Alexander & Peñalver, Properties of Community,
supra note 21.
169. Demsetz, Property Theory, supra note 121, at 354.
170. “Open access property” is a scheme of “universally distributed, all-encompassing
privilege.” Dagan and Heller, Liberal Commons, supra note 123, at 557.
171. Id. (thus defining a “commons”) (emphasis added).
172. See Kharkhordin, Collective and the Individual, supra note 154, at 77. See infra
Section II.A.2.b.
173. See KHARKHORDIN, COLLECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 154, at 77.
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same coin.”174 The central figure emerging from the Ukrainian
socialist account is not, as was the case with each of the Western
accounts, an individual, it is the Kollektiv—as long as we bear in
mind that forming a kollektiv is not meant to obliterate the individual but rather is meant to engender a certain kind of individual. A
question to bear in mind when considering post-Soviet decollectivization, then, is what would happen to this kind of community, a
way of life and experience of the self, when its material basis was
radically altered?
B.
1.

Commons Meets Collective: Critiquing Collective Ownership

Collective Property, Collective Action

During the same period that Ukrainians were constructing the
rural collectives of late socialism, collective property appeared as a
problem in Western scholarship. This Subsection is devoted to
understanding how collective property is formulated as a problem
in Western scholarship because this formulation occupies a central
place in Western critique of Soviet socialism and thus becomes a
primary justification for advocating post-Soviet privatization.
This line of scholarship proposes that collective ownership creates conditions for a particular kind of problem, a “collective
action problem.” It especially plagues groups holding collective
property because rational, self-interested individuals will not necessarily form a group that acts rationally in the group’s interests.175 If
a member of a group can gain access to a benefit without exerting
him or herself (that is, if a resource is “non-excludable” and therefore a public good),176 collective action to achieve the common
benefit is imperiled.177
Hence, one form of property, the commons,178 is characterized
as a breeding ground for collective action problems, particularly
susceptible to free-riders and other abusers and thus particularly
challenging to cooperation. Most famously, biologist Garrett Hardin argues that commons are structurally tragically prone to
indviduals’ overharvesting assets or overdumping liabilities.179 Eli174. Id.
175. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
176. Id. at 14–15.
177. Id. at 2.
178. See, e.g., Ellickson, Property in Land, supra note 122, at 1322.
179. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) [hereinafter
Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons]; see also, e.g., D.W. EHRENFIELD, CONSERVING LIFE ON EARTH
(1972); Garrett Hardin, Political Requirements for Preserving our Common Heritage, in WILDLIFE
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nor Ostrom offers a more nuanced study,180 wherein the commonpool resource evokes solutions ranging from central government
ownership (and management), to local management, to private
ownership.181 Despite her contributions, however, the conventional remedy for the paradigmatic tragedy of the commons continues to dominate the discourse: the way to internalize
externalities182 and achieve proper allocation of cost and benefit is
parceling the commons (or, in the case of an open-access resource,
access to it).183
2.

Great Expectations: Two Tragedies of the Collective,
Remedied?

Western critique of Soviet collective property drew formative
assumptions and understandings from Western understanding of
the commons. As it famously alleged and disputed of the commons, it proposes the rural collective of the U.S.S.R. was structurally vulnerable to over-harvest of assets or over-dumping of
liabilities, like Hardin’s iconic commons.184 Despite empirical
work on alternative approaches185 and synthetic work abstracting
AND AMERICA 310–17 (H.P. Brokaw ed., 1978); Ian Carruthers & Roy Stoner, Economic
Aspects and Policy Issues in Groundwater Development (World Bank, Staff Working Paper No.
496, 1981).
180. For a brief overview of three approaches to addressing collective action problems,
see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 8–21 (1990) [hereinafter OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS].
181. Regarding private ownership in particular, see Demsetz, Property Theory, supra note
121, at 347–59; see also OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 180, at 12–13 (discussing “Privatization as the ‘only’ Way”). While, Ostrom points out, it may at times be
“difficult to know what analysts mean” when they refer to developing private rights to some
common-pool resources, it is “clear that when they refer to land, they mean to divide the
land into separate parcels and assign individual rights to hold, use, and transfer these parcels . . . .” Id. at 13.
182. See Demsetz, Property Theory, supra note 121.
183. See id.; Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 179, at 1245; see also James E.
Krier, Marketlike Approaches: Their Past, Present, and Future, in REFORMING SOCIAL REGULATION: ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC POLICY STRATEGIES 151 (LeRoy Gramer and Frederick Thomson
eds. 1982). The conclusion about the tragic fate of open-access property is by no means
universally shared. Some theorists suggest open-access property be seen not as tragedy but
as comedy, i.e., not as the source of collective-action problems but as a source of solutions
to them. See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
184. See, e.g., Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 179.
185. For a few examples of empirical scholarship on informal normative regimes regulating open-access and regulated-access property within a mixed regime of informal and
formal normative orders, see, e.g., JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE
(1988); Virginia Bernhard, Bermuda and Virginia in the Seventeenth Century: A Comparative
View, 19 J. SOC. HIST. 57 (1985); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of Property
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from them186, to deal with the “problem” of collective property,
advice coalesced around privatization.187 This does not necessarily
contradict the claim that the many bureaucratic controls on use of
real property in the former U.S.S.R. created an “anti-commons” of
rights that must be reassembled under unified ownership188 for
efficient development.189 It may simply suggest a preferred
sequence, reassembling managerial rights before a resource is converted to private ownership. Some suggest that land privatization
captures previously wasted wealth, providing access to capital
through the establishment of collateral190 and correctly aligning
producer incentives to maximize efficiency.191 A few even propose
that private property and a market economy are necessary conditions for democracy.192
This last argument points to a second line of critique. In addition to the generic paradigm of commons tragedy, a second, political, tragedy identified with state socialism lurked in Western
consciousness: that collective ownership underwrote concentrations of political power resulting in authoritarianism. Here, tragedy takes the form of abuse of power and productive resources that
come from consolidation and an absence of accounting. Collectivization in its destructive phase is cited; the famine in Ukraine is
damning. Some historians indict collective property ownership in
Rights among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1986); Edmund S. Morgan,
The Labor Problem at Jamestown 1607-18, 76 AM. HIST. REV. 595 (1971).
186. See W. Ophuls, Leviathan or Oblivion, in TOWARD A STEADY STATE ECONOMY 215–30
(H.E. Daly ed., Freeman 1973), summarized in OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra
note 180, at 8–11 (“Leviathan as the only way”); see also, e.g., ACHESON, supra note 185;
Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1985–86). For discussion and synthesis of several case studies, see
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 180, at 18–19, 58–102, 143–81.
187. While a review of economic — rather than legal — accounts is beyond the scope
of this Article, economists obviously participated actively as Western advisers to post-socialist governments, influenced governmental decision-making, and deserve mention. For an
early participant, see, e.g., Jeffrey Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland,
paper presented at the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (Apr.
25-26, 1991), in Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1991 (National Technical Information Office, 1992), cited in Cohen & Schwartz,
Privatization in Eastern Europe, supra note 12, at 10.
188. In Anglo-American legal parlance, what is called for is fee-simple ownership.
189. See, e.g., Heller, Anti-Commons, supra note 13, at 622–27.
190. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD (1989).
191. See, e.g., Andrei Schliefer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 133
(1998) (private ownership yields greater efficiencies in production than state ownership
because competition exerts pressure on private owners to innovate).
192. See, e.g., Janos Kornai, What the Change of System from Socialism to Capitalism Does and
Does Not Mean, 14 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 27, 29, 35 (2000).
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providing the material support for an authoritarian from which
Ukraine suffered disproportionately.193 The remedy for this tragedy is dispersal of assets to myriad private owners, thereby strengthening their democratic voice and bringing accountability and
transparency to bear on state officials.194 This conception of the
tragedy of the collective reflects familiar elements: a Libertarian
concern with authoritarianism, a liberal concern with waste, a Jeffersonian answer of smallholding property owners.
This commons scholarship yielded conclusions about a two-fold
tragedy of the Soviet collective. The tragedy of the collective lies in
either waste to which private property brings efficiency; or authoritarianism, to which private property brings democracy. In either
case, in this scholarship, the commons is the site of tragedy and
private property, remedy.
C.

Property in Ideology: Market Democracy

Several accounts of private property’s beneficial relationship
with a citizenry’s capacity for self-governance, already in circulation
in the West at the time of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.195, combined with a diagnosis of economic and political tragedy of the
Soviet collective for which privatization was the remedy.196 Liberty
of Persons, Wealth of Nations, Democracy of Nations, and remedying economic and political tragedy of the Soviet collective are all
staked to private property. Thus, from a diverse range of scholarly
perspectives, private property emerges as the one remedy for sev193. See, e.g., ROBERT CONQUEST, THE HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION
TERROR-FAMINE (1986); ROBERT C. TUCKER, STALIN IN POWER (1990); For Ellickson’s brief discussion of the tragic effects of collectivization on Ukraine, see Ellickson,
Property in Land, supra note 122 and accompanying text.
194. Transparency and accountability became watchwords of the age. For some, they
refer to practices and values implicit in “neoliberalism,” when it is taken to refer narrowly
to specific traditions of ideas translated into techniques of contemporary government, such
as governmental practices internally regulated by hard budget constraints. See, e.g., STEPHEN COLLIER, POST-SOVIET SOCIAL: NEOLIBERALISM, SOCIAL MODERNITY, BIOPOLITICS
(2011).
195. See infra Section I.A., I.B., and I.C. (discussing several paradigmatic accounts of
the relationship between property and political community in U.S. legal scholarship).
196. Before the Soviet government dissolved the Union, some U.S. experts advocated
less categorical change, urging government ownership, private lease-holding users, and
local government management of leaseholds. See Nicolaus Tideman, Open Letter to Mikhail
Gorbachev (Nov. 7, 1990) (letter from U.S. economics and law professors advocating Soviet
Union not privatize land but instead have local governments determine and collect annual
rents from users), cited in Michael A. Heller, View from the Trenches, supra note 13, at 204 n.4.
After the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., such creativity largely evaporated and consensus in
favor of wholesale privatization emerged.
AND THE
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eral ills.197 An exemplary expression of this amalgam comes in
Cass Sunstein’s 1993 article, On Property and Constitutionalism. Written specifically in response to the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and
post-socialist transition, Sunstein urges the new post-socialist states
to create private ownership rights in property, arguing that private
property brings both prosperity and democracy, and that they in
turn are mutually reinforcing.198
In the United States, accounts of the relationship between property and political community had given rise to beliefs, practices,
blind spots, working assumptions: as under socialism, property had
become a matter of ideology as well as theory.199 This includes an
ideology of identity with property at its center, a defining diacritic
of Cold War rivals. As Harvard professor of government Samuel
Huntington expresses it, the United States’ “national identity” is
“defined by a set of universal political and economic values”: “liberty, democracy, equality, private property, and markets.”200 Theory and ideology thus unite to provide questions and answers
regarding the emergent situation.201 The United States and other
Western governments circulated a new term, “market democ197. Their chorus drowns out a few prominent voices raised in skepticism, arguments
neglected in policy formation and legal advising towards the former socialist states. For
the latter, see, e.g., Alexander, A Fourth Way, supra note 10; Duncan Kennedy, Neither the
Market nor the State: Housing Privatization Issues, in A FOURTH WAY?: PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET ECONOMICS 253 (Gregory S. Alexander &
Grazyna Skápka, eds., 1994).
198. Sunstein, supra note 13; see also, e.g., Lake, Containment to Enlargement, supra
note 9 (stating “America’s core values:” “We see individuals as equally created with a Godgiven right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. So we trust in the equal wisdom of
free individuals to protect those rights: through democracy, as the process for best meeting
shared needs in the face of competing desires; and through markets as the process for best
meeting private needs in a way that expands opportunity.”).
199. Cohen & Schwartz, Privatization in Eastern Europe, supra note 12, at 8 (describing
creation of private property as advised by American economists in post-socialist Europe as
“one failed [. . .] ideology” replacing another).
200. Samuel Huntington, Why International Primacy Matters, 17:4 INT’L SECURITY 68, 82
(1993); see also, e.g., Lake, Containment to Enlargement, supra note 9 (singling out democracy and market economics as “America’s core concepts”).
201. The sense of inevitability, the appearance of consensus, the absence of active policy debate over alternatives to land privatization are all features of an ideological milieu
that had taken considerable time and energy to forge in the U.S. While beyond the scope
of this Article, understanding the two decades of contention in the U.S. legal academy and
in U.S. politics after the 1960s is critical to understanding how the appearance of consensus arose in regard to privatization after 1991. For one introduction to this background,
see Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds., 2006).
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racy,”202 to express a link between economic and political liberalism that had become hegemonic.
Ideology of identity and ideas about security spurred policy. The
U.S. government deemed transformation of the former Soviet
states of “vital and historical importance” to the national security of
the United States.203 Although “democratization” was the goal,
property regime change was understood as inseparable from political regime change. In the transition to post-Soviet democratic governance, ran United States policy logic, “[I]f you do not
privatize . . . the whole thing is not going to work.”204 Promoting
“market democracy” became a matter of national security.205 Privatization, its key reform, took on an air of inevitability.206
The Wealth of Nations account eclipsed alternatives and Western advising on economic and political reform hewed most closely
to free-trade liberal policies. That said, in its ideals, Western
engagement with post-Soviet reforms was informed by all three
accounts. Even critics of Western economic advising in the postsocialist world like Janine Wedel207 are invested; disappointed
hopes like hers are the hopes of the three accounts. Programmatic
aspects of liberalism and the hopes and ideals of others became
subsumed under the heading of Market Democracy.208 This is not
to say that this formed a coherent program, nor that contradictions
between the various accounts had been reconciled. To the con202. Lake, Containment to Enlargement, supra note 9.
203. See U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 105th Cong. 10, 29 (1997) (statement of Thomas Dine,
Assistant Administrator for Europe and the Newly Independent States, U.S. Agency for
International Development).
204. See, e.g., U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 105th Cong. 10, 18 (1997) (statement of Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on
Assistance to the Newly Independent States).
205. Lake, Containment to Enlargement, supra note 9 (“The successor to a doctrine of
containment must be a strategy of enlargement — enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.”), excerpted in Anthony Lake, A Call to Enlarge Democracy’s
Reach, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 1993), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/26/week
inreview/the-world-verbatim-a-call-to-enlarge-democracy-s-reach.html?scp=1&sq=anthony+
lake&st=nyt (announcing a new national security doctrine for the United States in the postCold War period).
206. See, e.g., U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, supra
note 203; see also, e.g., John Williamson, Did the Washington Consensus Fail?, speech at
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 6, 2002) (transcript
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=488) (characterizing the “Washington Consensus” agenda, including privatization and property
rights, as “motherhood and apple pie, which is why they command a consensus”).
207. See WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION, supra note 8.
208. See Sunstein, supra note 13.
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trary. Some of these internal contradictions arose in the course of
law-reform advising schemes, a set of engagements that have yet to
be fully studied. But in their ideals, all three promised prosperity,
or at least economic self-sufficiency, and an economic basis
favorable to democracy. It was in their ends—prosperity and
democracy—and in their common starting point—private property—that they found common ground. Connecting the starting
point with the ends was where they differed and was opened up to
the least examination at the time privatization advice was
promulgated.
The post-Soviet Ukrainian government paid heed to pro-privatization Western scholarship and advocacy, deciding to unravel collective ownership, parcel, and privatize in pursuit of economic and
political reform. During the decade of debates over legalizing private property in the Ukrainian parliament, those in favor as well as
those opposed expected private property ownership to unleash
self-interest.209 Both sides expected a change in the soon-to-be
property owners, either more responsible, punctual, and less prone
to alcoholism, for example, or more greedy, self-serving, or
exploitative.
The response in the countryside was dramatic but startling to all.
In the period during which they received their plots of land, close
to 60% of the rural population evacuated their homes and moved
to a city within Ukraine.210 This came in addition to five million,
or 10% of the population, that had left Ukraine since independence in 1991.211 Not all farmlands were abandoned, of course. A
few farms operating today exceed expectations, dazzling in their
capital investment and productivity.212 Most, however, are dismay209. See, e.g., Ukrainian Communist Lawmakers Protest for Second Day Against Land Code,
KYIV POST (Oct. 26, 2001), available at http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukrain
ian-communist-lawmakers-protest-for-second-d-9976.html.
210. See International Organization for Migration Kyiv Mission, Labour Migration
Assessment for the WNIS Region (Oct. 2007) [hereinafter IOM LABOUR MIGRATION
ASSESSMENT].
211. Roughly two million emigrated permanently. Another 3 million left as labor
migrants, intending to return to Ukraine. See The State and Problems of Legal and Social Status
of Contemporary Ukrainian Labor Migration, Hearing of Parliament of Ukraine (Nov. 17,
2004) [hereinafter Labor Migration Hearing], available at http//portal.rada.gov.ua. Other
research indicates the figure for temporary labor migration might be higher. In April
2006, 15.7% of households reported at least one person had temporary work outside
Ukraine, according to the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine. See INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE,
UKRAINIAN SOCIETY 1992–2006 (V.Vorona, M.Shulga eds., 2006), cited in IOM LABOUR
MIGRATION ASSESSMENT, supra note 210.
212. See infra Section III.
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ingly deserted, abandoned by their working-age owners, populated
mostly by the very old with a small portion of the very young.213
The next two Sections examine the emergence of these settings,
boomtown and ghost town, in more detail.
III.

BOOMTOWN

This Section summarizes implementation of land privatization in
Ukraine in one locale.214 On the ground in Ukraine, building a
“market democracy” was not uppermost in the minds of Ukrainian
pioneers of privatization. This section describes some of their
motivations, constraints, and actions within a legal background.
Enterprise privatization predated land privatization in
Ukraine.215 Even before land privatization decollectivized farms,
the state had privatized facilities for food transport and food
processing—grain elevators, mills—upon which farms depend to
get their produce to consumers.216 The village of Yashkiv is home
to a sugar-beet sugar factory upon which farmers of the surrounding countryside depend to process the most valuable of their crops.
This is the story of how the Sugar Beet Factory of Yashkiv (although
privatized to its workers through enterprise privatization) and the
land of the surrounding collective farms (although privatized to
their farmers through land privatization) have ended up under the
de facto control of a group implicated in organized crime.217
Though only one slice of a diverse range of experience, it illuminates how implementation of land privatization may allow most of
213. See infra Section IV.
214. The ethnographic material in Section III is summarized from Monica Eppinger,
Reforming the Nation: Law and Land in Post-Soviet Ukraine 64–79 (2010) [hereinafter
Eppinger, Law and Land III] (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California
Berkeley) (on file with the University of California Berkeley Library).
215. See “On Privatization of Property of State-Owned Enterprises,” Resolution of Parliament of Ukr. No. 2164-12 (Mar. 4, 1992), amended by laws No. 2544-12 (July 7, 1992), No.
2621-12 (Mar. 18, 1992), No. 3875-12 (Jan. 26, 1994), No. 3982-12 (Feb. 22, 1994), and No.
64/95 (Feb. 15, 1995), and by Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 9-92 (Jan. 21, 1993)
and No. 15-93 (Feb. 19, 1993), available at http://www.brama.com/law/privatization/
privat_e.txt. For description of the creation of a legal basis for enterprise privatization and
the progress and setbacks of implementing enterprise privatization, see Yuri I. Yekhanurov,
The Progress of Privatization, in ECONOMIC REFORM IN UKRAINE: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA,
189–206 (Anders Aslund & George DeMenil eds., 2000).
216. See, e.g., USAID, TASK ORDER NO. OUT-EPE-I-804-95-00079-00, UKRAINE AGRO-MONOPOLIES PRIVATIZATION PROJECT (1999), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdabr
927.pdf (progress report on Ukrainian grain elevators and other storage facilities from
1999, two years before the land privatization law passed).
217. See infra Section III.C. (describing these groups, or “clans” (Ukrainian and Russian: klani), in greater detail).
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the rural land assets of value to end up in the hands of few and how
that in turn will affect political community in Ukraine.
A.

The Factory: Integration, Circulation, Concentration

The Yashkiv factory is a point of articulation between national
structures and the local countryside. First, as an asset of the
Ukrainian Foodstuffs Company (UFC), a national food processing
division of the multi-sector holding company Brovarych, it connects the locale to supralocal economic structures. UFC and four
rival companies own 40% of the sugar factories in Ukraine, the
remaining 60% either so run-down or lacking in beet supplies that
the five competitors control 70% of the domestic sugar market.218
The conceptualization of sugar beet processing puts the factory
in a particular relationship with the local countryside as well.
Investors reckon a sugar beet factory’s potential profitability by its
“zona”, an organizing principle of Soviet agronomy relating to the
local farms that supply a factory with beets.219 (Yashkiv’s zona comprises two former collective farms in surrounding areas, totaling
70,500 hectares, equivalent to 272 square miles.) When UFC
started investing in sugar beet factories nationally in 1995, they
found the beet supply unreliable.220 Farms’ equipment was old
(“and it was not that great to start with”)221 and liquidity or credit
to purchase newer technology or inputs like seeds, fertilizer, or
herbicide was unavailable.222 UFC dispensed with buying beets and
turned to producing beets themselves, leasing the farmlands of the
zona together with landowner labor,223 deals negotiated in aggregate with the collective farm director who negotiated on behalf of
the collective.224 These leaseholds became increasingly acceptable
218. See Interview with Mikhail Leonidovich Goldenberg, Founding Partner, Ukr.
Foodstuffs Co. (June 17, 2002), cited in Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 64.
219. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 67.
220. See id. at 66.
221. Interview with Mikhail Leonidovich Goldenberg, supra note 218, at 64.
222. See id. The kholkhoznik [collective farmer] has no realistic access to credit, according to a UFC investor: Even with a now-privatized land parcel, “they’re fourth out of four
classes of creditors banks consider. No money in the bank, no history with the bank, and if
they don’t pay you back the most you can get is a plot of land that even the local farmer
couldn’t make work.” Id. at 64 n.174.
223. Verdery coins the term “super-renter” to describe such a land user in privatized
Romania, higher in social and financial hierarchies than the landlord from whom he rents.
KATHERINE VERDERY, THE VANISHING HECTARE: PROPERTY AND VALUE IN POSTSOCIALIST TRANSYLVANIA 310–338 (2003) [hereinafter VERDERY, VANISHING HECTARE]. On “super-renters”,
see id. at 322.
224. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 65. At the time of the leasehold
negotiations, before the land privatization law, collective farmers had received share certifi-
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as collateral in private capital markets the more likely it seemed
land privatization would make it into legislation.225 Borrowing in
anticipation of the land privatization law’s passage in October
2001, UFC spent more than $3 million between August 2001 and
March 2002 on capital equipment for its farming operations in the
Yashkiw zona.226 While it spends big on equipment for lands it does
not own, UFC is chary with the sugar factory, which it does own.227
The sugar factory has thus, under the UFC owners, become a point
of articulation between the international and the local at which
circulations of international capital and equipment funnel down
and local labor and beets are concentrated in sugar and funnel up.
Raising sugar beets requires crop rotation, so UFC’s rented fields
regularly produce wheat or corn instead of beets.228 Accordingly,
UFC owns a controlling packet of shares in the Yashkiv grain elevator, a separate operation from the sugar-beet factory.229 In fact,
UFC owns substantially all of the other functioning enterprises in
Yashkiv, privatized in the 1990s and mostly related to food processing.230 UFC donations keep the local schools running as well, providing heat through the winter and computers for classrooms.231
The level of care of company toward local residents influences corporate land ownership decisions.232 Overall, the extent of horizontal integration between UFC, the town, and the zona is striking.
cates but not plots. See infra Section IV.A. (explaining share certificate allotment, plot
demarcation, and parcelization).
225. Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214. For anthropological treatment of the
concept and practice of collateral, see generally ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE:
LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011).
226. See id. at 68.
227. See Interview with Mikhail Leonidovich Goldenberg, supra note 218, at 66.
228. Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 70.
229. See Interview with Mikhail Leonidovich Goldenberg, supra note 218, at 64.
230. See id.
231. See Interview with Valentyn Sergeyevich, Dir. Yashkiv Sugar Beet Factory (June 17,
2002), cited in Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 67. When asked why the
sugar factory shouldered a substantial amount of the expenses of the local K-12 schools
when asked for help, he answered, “How can you say no? That’s our school. Our kids go
there [meaning, his workers’ kids]. We don’t do everything, but we do what we can.” Id.
232. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 66. Explaining why the company would prefer to lease land instead of buy, Sergei Aleksandrovich Pokushai, Exec. Dir.,
Ukr. Foodstuffs Co., stated, “It’s way too expensive. You buy enough land to farm with 40
or 50 people; 200 people live there, and you have to take care of all of them: health care,
schools, the whole range of social services.” See Interview with Sergei Aleksandrovich
Pokushai, Exec. Dir., Ukr. Foodstuffs Co. (June 14, 2002), in Eppinger, Law and Land III,
supra note 214, at 66. Although the obligation to provide social services is not required by
law, it is keenly felt nonetheless: “No, the obligation does not come from the law. But for
70 years [of Soviet life], we lived like that – people expected if you give them work, you give
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Origins of Corporation: Social and Financial Capital

At the time of UFC’s inception in 1995, just three founders and a
secretary under the Brovarych umbrella, Brovarych was already a
major player in the Ukrainian economy.233 Among other activities,
from the early 1990s Brovarych had been one of the main energy
traders in Ukraine.234 Squeezed out of the barter market for oil
products by rougher Russian competitors in the mid-1990s, Brovarych began looking for activities.235 Its diesel trade had brought
it into regular contact with sugar factories. “We were used to dealing with them, we had relationships with them.”236 The four
employees of UFC and Brovarych, looking for niches into which
other private companies had not ventured, decided to try sugar.237
None of the four had prior experience in agriculture or food
processing, but that was not as important as their relationships with
sugar-factory directors and with Brovarych head Hrihoriy Medved,
who had access to funds. Medved provided the start-up capital for
buying factories, but UFC had to make its debt payments to
Medved and turn a profit from the first year.238 (To purchase combines for the Yashkiv zona, UFC could obtain loans from an Austrian investment bank, and at a much better interest rate, thanks to
the 2001 changes to the land law changing perceptions and creating collateral value in leaseholds.)239
The results in Yashkiv have been remarkably profitable and
socially constructive. In the first two years after UFC acquired it
and began providing inputs and equipment to farmers in the zona,
sugar output at the factory more than doubled.240 For the 15,865
residents of Yashkiv241 and the farmers of the zona, the advent of
UFC’s investment has meant steady paychecks for the first time
since the Soviet Union dissolved.242 The overall picture is one of a
them social services. What are you going to do? Suddenly throw them out on the streets?”
Id.
233. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 70.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Interview with Mikhail Leonidovich Goldenberg, supra note 218, at 70.
237. See id.
238. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 71.
239. See id. at 69.
240. From 54 tons in the year 1 harvest to 130 tons in the year 3 harvest. See Eppinger,
Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 69.
241. Population figure as of 2001 from the Association of Ukrainian Cities,
www.auc.org.ua.
242. See Interview with Misha Kukel, Driver for Zhashkiv Sugar-Beet Sugar Factory
(June 17, 2002), cited in Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 69.
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reversal of an inefficient drain of local resources: an agriculture
drain, as beets and other local crops were grown and processed less
efficiently; a combine-drain, as existing farm equipment, in the
absence of reinvestment, was cannibalized for parts; a brain-drain,
as the most talented, ambitious, or hungry of the area outmigrated.243 The situation in Yashkiv has turned around thanks to
UFC’s investment. UFC, in turn, praises the Land Code as the
most important development that has aided its enterprises.244
C.

Acquisition

The story of successful economic development through land
privatization is not that simple, however, for two complicating reasons. The first is the means by which UFC acquired the Yashkiv
factory and its other plants. The second is the place of parent company Brovarych, and its owner, Medved, in the social structure of
Ukrainian politics during this period in which the political elite
undertook fundamental reforms through legal change.
Changes in tax law set the stage for UFC’s maneuvering. Tax
legislation in the mid-1990s on collective farms lacked clarity
because of the changing, and thus unclear, status of legal ownership of collective farm land. For example, the 1996 law setting
land tax rates reads, “Tax means monetary payment by legal entities and private individuals for the use of land parcels.”245 The
reformers in parliament could read it as a property tax on privatelyheld land; their antagonists could read it as national rental rates
for use of state-owned land.246 The land tax law set an annual .1%
tax on the value of a land parcel (determined per land-value formulas set during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine)247 Land taxes
were thus instituted when the state still controlled prices of most
grain and commodity prices did not keep pace with rising tax costs
243. The principal of a local school beamed with pride as he spoke of the factory director UFC hired in Kyiv to run the Yashkiv factory. “He’s a Yashkiv boy. He’s the first one in
fifteen years who left the town to attend university or work, and came back to us. We need
more like him.” (The factory director returned to Yashkiv in October 2000 as an employee
of UFC/Brovarych.) Interview with Ivan Ivanovych, Principal, Yashkiv Cent. Sch. (June 17,
2002), cited in Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 69.
244. See Goldenberg, supra note 218.
245. The Law of Ukraine amending the Law of Ukraine “On Payment for Land,” art. 1,
No. 378/96, Sept. 19, 1996, and No. 379/96 Jan. 1, 1997, with amendments introduced by The
Law of Ukraine, No. 404/97, July 27, 1997.
246. Lest it be confused with an income tax on the fruits of agricultural land, the law
specifies, “The amount of land tax does not depend on the results of production activities
of land owners and land users.” Id. art. 4.
247. See id.
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to producers.248 Massive defaults on tax and tax-penalty debts by
state enterprises followed.249
The Yashkiv sugar factory had been privatized and formally
belonged to its worker-shareholders.250 It had also been subject to
the national property tax for the first time since pre-Soviet times
during a time when controlled commodity prices and a collapsing
economy meant that revenues could not keep up with its property
tax debt.251 The four employees of UFC made it their business to
research the sugar-beet factories of Ukraine.252 Their research
mainly covered two areas. First, they researched which factories
had the largest profit potential based on longitudinal studies of
Soviet-era production.253 Soviet agronomy taught that, while tinkering with plant equipment can reap marginal increases in efficiency, the largest determinant of productivity is the fertility of the
land around a sugar-beet factory, the zona.254 UFC’s first step was
to locate sugar factories whose zona yielded a much higher ratio of
sugar-per-beet than other factories’.255 This information rested
largely in local and national archives not organized to facilitate
public access. Finding the correct records depended on the expertise, and sometimes the permission to search, of archivists.256 The
UFC employees secured archivists’ cooperation partly through
bribes and sometimes through the fear or respect inspired by
Medved’s reputation as head of the “Kiev Klan.”257
A type of “financial-industrial group,” this formation and its
head, the oligarch, are figures that by the mid-1990s became a
prominent feature of discussions of business organization across
the former Soviet Union. Ukrainian analysts call the most powerful of these political and economic alliances klani (clans).258 Klani
248. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 72.
249. See Interview with Bohdan Chomiak, Officer of Agric. Land Programs, USAID Kyiv
(June 20, 2002).
250. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 72.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 72–73.
254. Id. at 73.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. In order to distinguish this metaphor from the technical kinship term, I will refer
to it by the transliteration of the Soviet word klan (pl. klani). There is no relation to the
U.S. Ku Klux Klan, colloquially called “the Klan” in American English.
258. See, e.g., SLAVKO PIKHOVSHEK, DNIPROPETROVSK VS. THE SECURITY SERVICE (1996)
[hereinafter PIKHOVSHEK, DNIPROPETROVSK]. For a an analytical description of “clans” in
another region of the post-Soviet space, see EDWARD SCHATZ, MODERN CLAN POLITICS: THE
POWER OF “BLOOD” IN KAZAKHSTAN AND BEYOND (2004). For an operational description of
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are not synonymous with the mafia. The latter, by definition, concentrate on running protection rackets parasitic on other businesses whereas the former run businesses themselves. Mafia
activity thus by definition rivals the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force and is thus categorically outside the law.259 The
core of klan activity is, by and large, within the law. In fact, klani
make it part of their business to support political parties and politicians and thereby to help make the law.260 However, klani, like the
mafia, are creatures of post-socialist private property rights,
although the relationships between core members may originate in
the social networks of late socialism.261 The typical klan unites several forms of private property – a private bank or other institution
specialized in arranging credit or formalizing informal financial
arrangements; a powerful industrial enterprise or sector; media
outlets – and several conduits to elected officials or state bureaucracies. In Ukraine, the networks of relationships262 along which
klan sociability runs are often based in klan members’ regions of
origin in late socialism.263 The concept of klani illuminates one
mode in which members of the political elite may take collective
action on a given problem.
To return to UFC’s entry into the sugar-beet sugar business, in
addition to gathering soil-yield information, UFC manipulated the
tax collection process to acquire the plant at a non-public auction.264 In order to do this, the three directors ascertained the tax
debt owed by those factories whose zona promised the highest
“clans” in Russia after President Putin’s re-election, see MINCHENKO CONSULTING, VLADIMIR
PUTIN’S BIG GOVERNMENT AND POLITBURO 2.0 (Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://
minchenko.ru/netcat_files/File/Big%20Government%20and%20the%20Politburo%20
2_0.pdf; MINCHENKO CONSULTING, POLITBURO 2.0 AHEAD OF A REALIGNMENT OF ELITE
GROUPS (Jan.-Feb. 2013), available at http://www.minchenko.ru/netcat_files/File/
MC%20_report.doc; Laurnas Kasnas, Marius Laurnaviius, & Vytautas Kersanskas, Vladimir
Putin’s Pyramid of Rule: Who Really Governs Russia?, DELFI: THE LITHUANIAN TRIBUTE (Aug.
4, 2014), available at http://en.delfi.lt/central-eastern-europe/vladimir-putins-pyramid-ofrule-who-really-governs-russia.d?id=65432116.
259. For a description of mafia, see, e.g., FREDERICO VARESE, THE RUSSIAN MAFIA
(2001).
260. See generally Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 74–79.
261. For description of how late Soviet social networks became active in the post-Soviet
context in Russia, see, e.g., Alexei Yurchak, Entrepreneurial Governmentality in post-Socialist
Russia: a Cultural Investigation of Business Practices, in THE NEW ENTREPRENEURS OF EUROPE
AND ASIA (Victoria Bonnell & Thomas Gold eds., 1999) [hereinafter Yurchak,
Entrepreneurial Governmentality].
262. For discussion of Soviet networks, see KHARKHORDIN, COLLECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 154, at 315–16.
263. See Pikhovshek, DNIPROPETROVSK, supra note 258.
264. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 73.
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profit potential. The law is silent on the privacy of tax records, but
as a matter of practice, tax records are not publicly available in
Ukraine.265 Finding out tax debt information meant cultivating
contacts in the tax administration at the local government (raion)
level and activating Brovarych contacts in Kiev.266 Armed with
figures on tax arrears, UFC would draw the attention of the Tax
Inspectorate in Kiev to the plant’s tax debt.267 The Tax Inspectorate, responsible for inspecting and collecting on tax debts nationwide, is overwhelmed with enterprises in arrears.268 It has the
reputation for choosing which enterprises to investigate based on
executive-branch orders aimed at businesses of political rivals or
takeover targets.269 The Tax Inspectorate, having the authority to
seize real property or other assets to satisfy tax arrears, is often
feared by enterprise directors and owners.270 Rather than a partial
seizure of assets that could reduce a plant’s productive capacity,
UFC would propose an alternative solution: a quiet seizure of the
plant by the tax authority and subsequent “auction” to a buyer willing and able to satisfy the tax debt.271 The tax authority would
agree to this arrangement (and often, the plant director would be
notified), and the entire seizure and resale would be effected in a
single day, without public notice.272
This process accomplished three purposes. It allowed UFC to
acquire plants that had already been privatized and which were not
currently “for sale” (either because the worker-owners did not wish
to sell, or because there was effectively no market for enterprises in
Ukraine after the first generation of privatization had taken place).
Second, it allowed UFC to acquire plants without attracting poten265. See generally Podatkovii Kodeks Ukraini, Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Radi Ukraini
(VVR), (Tax Code of Ukraine, Bulletin of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine) 2011, No. 13-14,
No. 15-16, No. 17, at 112, available at http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2755-17.
266. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 73.
267. See id.
268. See id. For description of the Tax Inspectorate’s duties, see generally website of
the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine, available at http://sfs.gov.ua/. For comparative analysis
of Ukraine’s Tax Inspectorate, see VERENA FRITZ, STATE-BUILDING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
UKRAINE, LITHUANIA, BELARUS, AND RUSSIA (2007).
269. See, e.g., Taras Kuzio, Ukraine Moves to State Capitalism and “Militocracy,” EURASIA
DAILY MONITOR (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/
single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38740&cHash=e2daaca2b0f009f27710104220fdd80f#.
VRSSZChSark; see also, e.g., Criminal Case Opened Against Top Tax Official in Crimea, KYIV
POST (MAY 4, 2011), available at http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/criminal-caseopened-against-top-tax-inspectorate—103619.html.
270. See Kuzio, supra note 288.
271. Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 73.
272. See id. at 71.
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tial competitive bidders, for prices well below the market valuation
(upon which, inter alia, the property tax had supposedly been
based). Finally, it allowed UFC to acquire plants without attracting
the attention or ire of Brovarych’s political and economic rivals as
participation in public auction might have done.
UFC found it prudent to keep a low profile because, among
other reasons, Hrihoriy Medved is a klan leader whom some also
consider heavily implicated in Ukrainian organized crime.273
Medved avoids attracting the attention of rivals or provoking the
jealousy of allies. He raised his initial capital through various black
market dealings in the late Soviet and early independence periods;
UFC was one of the agricultural subsidiaries through which he
laundered those profits after 1994.274 Medved provided three
essential assets to the four employees of UFC. He supplied them
with contacts at the tax inspectorate and elsewhere in order to
learn what they needed about tax arrears and to make trustworthy
deals on tax-arrear auctions.275 He supplied them with a fierce reputation, so that interlocutors at the local level or in Kiev would not
cross them.276 Finally, he supplied them with start-up capital with
which to purchase the tax debt for the first UFC plants and cover
other initial costs.277 These three assets, I propose, were necessary
for leveraging the anti-commons in Ukraine. Medved’s reputation
and networks, more than individual bribes, allowed UFC to obtain
from public officials information not otherwise available and to use
it in ways not available to other members of the public. His reputation raised the perceived costs to individual officials of not cooperating and raised confidence that they would be protected from
subsequent sanction by their supervisors.278 Given that UFC exists
by the grace of Brovarych, a political-economic alliance, it takes a
great interest in local politics; given the extent of horizontal integration, few elections in Yashkiv or its zona take place outside of the
network of relations and expectations of UFC’s political affiliates.
273. For a report produced for interested Western readers on the overlap in social
networks between post-Soviet entrepreneurs and organized crime in Ukraine at the time
Medved was consolidating his Yashkiv holdings, see, e.g., ALEXANDER N. YARMYSH, UKRAINIAN ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS: A BEHAVIORAL MODEL 10–13 (2004) (unpublished copy
made available by National Criminal Justice Reference Service of U.S. Department of Justice at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/204378.pdf).
274. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 74.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 66–79.
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Review of the Boomtown

The dramatic increase in agricultural production after land
privatization in Yashkiv and its zona is typical of a nation-wide boom
after the collective farms were disbanded.279 In this Section, I
investigate how that happened. As the next Section describes, the
land privatization law and previous executive orders provide a
foundation for private investment in agriculture.280 The argument
that I make in this Section is that the legal measures awarding title
to agricultural land are not sufficient to explain who controls agricultural land or production. The efficiency gains from production
on privately-owned agricultural land must pass through funnels to
get to market: food storage, transport, and processing facilities.281
Second, while market incentives now shape the activities of investors in the agricultural sector, their behavior cannot be explained
without reference to prior norms of responsibility and forms of
care of plant managers (in this case, the UFC owners) to farmers
and workers.282 Third, a small number of investors in the agricultural sector have amassed large amounts of land through leaseholds with newly privatized farmers.283 Typically these investors are
corporations but, like the UFC investing in Yashkiv, consist of a
very small number of persons: by 2004, 16% of the corporate
farms nationally were single-shareholder entities and 31% had
from 1-3 shareholders.284 While the number of people in the
investing corporation is small, the amount of privatized land they
control is large, averaging in one authoritative survey 1700 hectares, which is three times larger than the average corporate farm in
the U.S. (500-600 hectares).285 Fourth, banks are not making loans
to the new rural landowners to purchase equipment.286 They are
making loans to these cosmopolitan “brokers” who mediate provisions of capital between the Ukrainian countryside and international capital, obtaining loans in part based on the perceived
collateral value of their leaseholds from the new private farmers.287
279. National agricultural productivity rose 30% between 1999 and 2004. See, e.g., ZVI
LERMAN, ET AL., UKRAINE AFTER 2000: A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN LAND AND FARM POLICY? 2
(2006) [hereinafter FAO Land Policy Report], available at http://departments.agri.huji.
ac.il/economics/lerman-fao-study.pdf.
280. See infra Section IV.A.
281. See text infra Section III.A.
282. See text infra Section III.B.
283. See infra Section III.C.
284. See FAO Land Policy Report, supra note 279, at 2.
285. See id. at 3.
286. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 78.
287. See id.
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For some of these brokers, crime provided the initial capital and
corruption shaped early patterns of legitimate investment in the
agricultural sector, setting investment organizations that began as
criminal groups on a trajectory of ownership and influence in the
future.288 Establishing a market, and relying on market incentives
alone, will not result in an optimally functioning economy or
democracy. In fact, supplying organized criminal groups with
fixed legal assets may put both the economy and the political system on trajectories for a distinctly worse future. The central figure
of this property account is not the landowner but the Oligarch, by
which we mean both the person at the apex of a financial-industrial
group, the aspirants that would be head, and the supporting members of his klan.
The klani have not infiltrated most villages and former collective
farm areas in Ukraine. The next Section describes these areas
devoid of investors, far from access to international financial markets, left to their own devices. The boomtown enjoys dramatic
gains in efficiency and agricultural production but potentially disastrous effects on democratic development. In the ghost town, we
see practically its converse.
IV.

GHOST TOWN

The Boomtown is the exception; its counterpart of the rural
countryside, the Ghost Town, is the rule. The following account
situates creation of the ghost town within larger processes of building a post-Soviet state.289 The first part hinges on altering the basis
of the right to exclude. In this “legislative history,” the history of
legal measures is interwoven with the history of creating the
authority to enact legal measures. The evolution of property rights
occurs in tandem with governance practices and formal institutions
of political community. The second part of the ghost town story
turns on the reintroduction of mobility to Ukrainian village life,
part of a larger untethering process of decolonization. Together,
these measures created the conditions of possibility for the ghost
towns that haunt most of the Ukrainian countryside. This Section
concludes with a brief description of life in the ghost town.
288. See id.
289. The ethnographic material in Section IV is summarized from Monica Eppinger,
Reforming the Nation: Law and Land in Post-Soviet Ukraine, at 77–92, esp. 77–78 and
87–90 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Berkeley) (on file
with the University of California Berkeley Library) [hereinafter Eppinger, Law and Land
IV].
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Capital Games, Conversions, Divisions, and Untethering

With independence, national policy decisions including land
privatization were implicated in broader struggles over state formation and economic. Power was unsettled.290 In the five years
before a post-Soviet constitution passed291, the President operated
within a late-Soviet-shaped mantle of executive power, strong on
bureaucratic centralization but short on nimbleness.292 The parliament, stilled called the Supreme Soviet (Verkhovna Rada), contained a mix: anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists; pro-reform
pragmatists; and Socialists, Communists, and those resistant to
change.293 Core among the latter, directors of collective farms
elected to parliament from their village voting districts (nicknamed
the “Red Directors”) opposed pro-market reforms that might
undermine their local authority.294 Land privatization and other
economic reforms were debated at the same time, and by the same
people, as constitutional divisions of power between the branches;
federal questions of central versus local power; and rules for allocating the productive assets of the Soviet state that could determine personal enrichment.295 Among political actors in Kyiv,
moves to break up or keep collective farms were part of a strategy
in several simultaneous short-term and long-term games.
An initial step towards decollectivization came in two 1995 presidential orders. The first abolished state farms and converted them
into collective farms (collectively but undividedly owned by the
residents of the farm).296 The second provided that each resident
290. See Monica Eppinger, On Common Sense, in STUDYING UP, DOWN, AND SIDEWAYS:
ANTHROPOLOGY AT WORK 194 (Rachael Stryker and Roberto Gonzalez eds., 2014) [hereinafter Eppinger, On Common Sense].
291. See Konst. Ukr. [UKRAINE CONSTITUTION] (1996) [hereinafter KONST. UKR.].
292. See Eppinger, On Common Sense, supra note 290, at 194–204.
293. See D. Nohlen and P. Stöver, Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook, 1961 (2010);
see also SARAH WHITMORE, STATE-BUILDING IN UKRAINE: THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT,
1990–2003 49–91 (2004).
294. See WHITMORE, supra note 293, chs 3–5.
295. For discussion of the allocations of state assets and other maneuvers during the
formation of state power in post-Soviet Ukraine during the 1990s and early 2000s, see, e.g.,
PAUL D’ANIERI, UNDERSTANDING UKRAINIAN POLITICS: POWER, POLITICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN (2007) (evaluating multi-party state institution-building in light of power politics in
Ukraine); see also, e.g., SERHIY KUDELIA, REVOLUTIONARY BARGAIN: THE UNMAKING OF
UKRAINE’S AUTOCRACY THROUGH PACTING, in DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN UKRAINE: FROM
KUCHMAGATE TO ORANGE REVOLUTION 78–101 (Taras Kuzio ed., 2013).
296. See Ukaz Prezidenta Ukraini “Pro Poryadok Payuvannya Zemel, Peredannikh u
Kollektivny Vlasnist Silskohospodarskim Pidpriemstvam i Organizatsiyam” [Order of the
President of Ukraine “On the Parcelization of Land, Given into Collective Ownership to
Agricultural Enterprises and Organizations”], Order No. 720/95, Aug. 8, 1995 [hereinafter
Presidential Order No. 720/95 on Parcelization], reprinted in ZAKONODAVSTVO UKRAINI PRO
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or retired worker of a collective farm be issued a “land and asset
certificate” documenting the person’s ownership of a share of the
farm.297 Every farm was to set up a “Land Committee” to compile a
list of residents and pensioners who “belonged” to the farm and
were therefore entitled to certificates. This order introduced farmers to the concept of divisibility and created an exercise by which
farmers imagined division of the collective. However, as a practical
matter it also reinforced some of the bonds within the collective,
for example, by forcing local committees to name who belonged to
the farm and who did not.298
One detail held significance for the emerging shape of rural
political community. The executive order did not change the governance structure of the collective farms to empower the new
shareholders in decision-making. The office of collective farm
director299 persisted from Soviet times,300 often encumbered by the
same person.301 To distribute land certificates, the central government depended on collective farm directors, who proved spottily
unreliable in the task,302 perhaps reluctant to undermine the institution upon which their director status depended.303
ZEMLYU [LEGISLATION OF UKRAINE ON LAND] 162–63 (Urinkom Inter 2002) [hereinafter
LEGISLATION OF UKRAINE ON LAND]. The order retained 10% of each state farm’s acreage
to be held and administered by a public entity, the village council (silska rada, a local
elected body).
297. Timchasoviy Poryadok Provedennya Robit Vydachy Derzhanykh Aktiv Kolektivnym Silskohospadarskim Pidpryemstvam, Siskohospodarskim Kooperativam, Silskohospodarskim Aktsionernim Tovarstvam, u tomu Chisli Stvorenym na Bazi Radhospiv ta
Inshikh Derzhavnikh Silskohospodarskhikh Pidpriemstv, na Pravo Kolektivnoi Vlasnosti Na
Zemlyu [A Temporary Order for Carrying Out Work of Given Government Acts to Collective Agricultural Enterprises, Agricultural Cooperatives, Agricultural Joint-Stock Companies, and those formed on the Basis of Sovkhoz and Other Governmental Agricultural
Enterprises, on the Right of Collective Ownership to Land], confirmed by Order of the State
Committee of Ukraine on Land Resources, No. 18/15, Mar. 1995, reprinted in LEGISLATION
OF UKRAINE ON LAND, supra note 296, at 162–63.
298. Id.
299. See Model Collective Farm Charter, 10 Spravochnik Partinogo Rabotnika (“Handbook
of the Party Worker”) 175 (1970), cited in DONALD D. BARRY, The Spravochnik Partinogo
Rabotnika as a Source of Party Law in RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THEIR STATUS
UNDER LAW 37, 45 (Dietrich A. Loeber ed., 1986).
300. C.P.W., Collective Farming in the U.S.S.R. Post-War Consolidation of Control. 11 WORLD
TODAY, 470, 470–71 (1948), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40392073 (describing
the post-War office of the collective farm director in the U.S.S.R.).
301. See generally JESSICA ALLINA-PISANO, THE POST-SOVIET POTEMKIN VILLAGE: POLITICS
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BLACK EARTH (2008).
302. Id. at 69–72 (describing how collective farm directors retained control of share
certificates).
303. See Katherine Verdery, Seeing like a Mayor Or, How Local Officials Obstructed
Romanian Land Restitution, 3 ETHNOGRAPHY 18 (2002) (suggesting that in neighboring
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The Constitution of independent Ukraine, passed in June
1996,304 ensured that private ownership of land in Ukraine was not
per se illegal,305 removing a handy cudgel from the Left’s arsenal—
but neither did the new Constitution require decollectivization. In
this uncertain milieu, sources of directors’ authority was shifting
from formal position to new forms of social and cultural capital
and their positional power, as a parliamentary voting block and in
local economies, increasingly lost footing as regionally based klani
emerged.306 This shifting position accelerated when the meaning
attached to the land share certificates expanded. In 1999, an executive order decreed that a land share certificate refer to a demarcated plot of land, not merely an intangible share in the collective,
implying that in principle a certificate-holder could elect to withdraw from collective production and farm independently.307
In the presidential election of 1999, land share distribution
clearly correlated with voter preference. In areas where the certificates had been issued, incumbent President Leonid Kuchma was
the clear winner; in areas where directors managed to withhold
them, Communist Party candidate Petro Symonenko, who opposed
privatization, won overwhelmingly.308 Presented with this evidence, the first presidential decree Kuchma signed after re-election in December 1999 disbanded the post-Soviet successor to the
collective farms (“collective agricultural enterprises”) entirely.309
At the same time, the state changed its system of assisting farm production, switching from directly supplying inputs to subsidizing
interest rates for agricultural loans,310 giving producers more control over what to grow and how, but also increasing the role of
lenders and the status of gatekeepers facilitating or controlling
access to them.
Romania, local officials resisted distributing titles, a finite good which once given out could
no longer serve as a basis for patronage).
304. See KONST. UKR., supra note 291, art. 41.
305. See id. arts. 13–14.
306. See infra Section III.C.
307. See Presidential Order No. 720/95 on Parcelization, supra note 296.
308. See ANDRAS BOZOKI & JOHN T. ISHIYAMA, THE COMMUNIST SUCCESSOR PARTIES OF
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 403–404, 408 (2002) (detailing the 1999 presidential election results).
309. Pro Nevidkladni Zakhodi shchodo Priskorennya Reformuvannya Agrarnoho
Sektora Ekonomiki [On the Uninvested Means concerning Accelerating Reform of the
Agrarian Sector of the Economy], Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 1529/99, Dec. 3,
1999, reprinted in LEGISLATION OF UKRAINE ON LAND, supra note 296, at 85.
310. See id.
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The next step in this experimental path towards privatization,
constitution-implementing legislation explicitly authorizing private
ownership of land, passed in October 2001.311 A tectonic shift in
the constitution of political community was underway. The new
Land Code conferred the right to a parcel of land, not just to a
shareholder certificate.312 By June 1, 2002, just over six months
after the new Code passed into law, 41% of eligible farmers had
asserted their claim to a parcel.313 In parliamentary elections in
March 2002 (six months after the Land Code passed), pro-reform
parties won 70% of parliamentary seats allocated to party lists;
Communist Party seats fell to 20%, their lowest ever.314 Initially
interpreted as a sign of widespread rural pro-privatization sentiment, subsequent reactions and lived experience proved more difficult to interpret.
This dramatic process of decollectivization took place against
another, much quieter revolution in the relationship between citizen and locality. The most direct bureaucratic link between citizen
and locality in Soviet life had been the residential registration
(propiska) and internal passport system.315 It required every Soviet
citizen to register residence with state authorities, binding each to
a locale, and to carry an “internal passport” as identity document.316 These measures to regulate mobility on Ukrainian territory bore a distinctly colonial cast, originating in the late
eighteenth century as a means to eliminate Ukrainians’ free movement and extend Russian imperial control southward overly newly
acquired Ukrainian territories.317 The Soviet government sus311. See Land Code, supra note 17.
312. See id.
313. See A Good Deed Indeed for Owners of Farmland, KYIV WEEKLY (Ukr.), June 14, 2002, at
21.
314. See ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE) OFFICE OF
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, UKR. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 31 Mar.
2002 FINAL REP. 24 (May 27, 2002), available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/
ukraine/14947?download=true.
315. See generally Eppinger, Law and Land IV, supra note 289, at 117–22. See generally
MERVYN MATTHEWS, THE PASSPORT SOCIETY: CONTROLLING MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA AND IN THE
U.S.S.R. (1993) (discussing the passport system and its accompanying bureaucratic
processes). See also Tova Hojdestrand, The Soviet-Russian Production of Homelessness:
Propiska, Housing, Privatization (2003), available at http://www.anthrobase.com/Txt/H/
Hoejdestrand_T_01.htm (discussing the role of propiska in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian
society).
316. See MATTHEWS, supra note 315.
317. See Z. Kohut, THE ABOLITION OF UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY, 1763–1786: A CASE STUDY
IN THE INTEGRATION OF A NON-RUSSIAN AREA INTO THE EMPIRE, 208–306 (1975) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania); see also ISABEL DE MADARIAGA, RUSSIA IN THE TIME OF CATHERINE THE GREAT 68, 308–14 (1981).
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pended them briefly after the 1917 Revolution, only to re-impose
mobility restrictions during the Famine in 1933, a lethal way of
keeping peasants on the collectives and out of bread supplies
meant for urban workers.318 During the late Soviet period, more
positive incentives reinforced bonds of affiliation between a citizen
and her locale, for example a constitutional guarantee of housing
in the 1977 Soviet Constitution.319
Soviet mobility restrictions were abolished by deliberate omission from the 1996 Constitution of independent Ukraine.320 The
state, for the first time since 1783, does not seek to control mobility
of its citizens. The new Constitution affirmed the right to change
residence and workplace without permission or control from state
authorities.321 (Although it does allow for a system of local registration, registration does not bind the citizen to a particular locale;322
it is purely an administrative measure for organizing rights like suffrage or obligations like tax payment, not for blocking mobility.)
Under the 1996 Constitution, any Ukrainian citizen has the right
freely to leave the territory of Ukraine, meaning an international
passport is available to any Ukrainian citizen who applies for
one.323
Five million, or 10% of the population, availed themselves of an
international passport and ended up residing outside Ukraine—at
least temporarily—since independence.324 Others who stayed in
Ukraine largely stayed put, until an abrupt change after October
2001. In other words, the period of actual land privatization, during which collectives were divided up and farmlands parceled as
property to resident farmers, coincided with a mass exodus of the
318. Resolution of the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom, “Ob
ustanovlenii edinoi pasportnoi sistemy v SSSR” [On the Establishment of a Unitary Passport System of the U.S.S.R.] (December 27, 1932), promulgated in PRAVDA 1 (December 28,
1932). See MOSHE LEWIN, THE MAKING OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON IN THE SOCIAL
HISTORY OF INTERWAR RUSSIA 220 (1985); see also STEPHEN KOTKIN, MAGNETIC MOUNTAIN:
STALINISM AS CIVILIZATION (1995) (describing the role of bureaucratic measures like the
propiska and policy decisions in construction of a way of life particular to the Soviet Union
under Stalin).
319. See KONST. SSSR, supra note 116, art. 44.
320. See KONST. UKR., supra note 291, art. 33 (omitting mobility restrictions, guaranteeing freedom of movement).
321. Id.
322. Pro Svobodu peresyvannya ta viln’nyy vybir mistsya prozhivannya v Ukrayini [The
Law of Ukraine “On Freedom of Movement and Free Choice of Place of Residence in
Ukraine“] art. 3.
323. See KONST. UKR., supra note 291, art. 33.
324. Roughly two million emigrated permanently. The other three million left as labor
migrants, intending to return to Ukraine. See Labor Migration Hearing, supra note 211.
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newly-endowed farmers from the countryside. After the passage of
the Land Code, at least 20% of the Ukrainian population, roughly
10 million people, evacuated their homes and moved to a new location within Ukraine; the majority are rural out-migrants.325 The
remainder of this Section explores the “ghost towns” abandoned by
the majority of their newly enpropertied residents.
B.

Life in the Ghost Town

The scene at the Red Star farm was impressive in its uniformity
with most other Ukrainian villages five years after the Land Code
passed. The countryside was empty except for a couple of late middle-aged women diligently hoeing rows of beets by hand,
exhausted.326 The weather. The isolation. But mostly, the work. It was
back-breaking and they were too old for it. At some point in our
conversation, a man their age wandered up and pointed out that
what you would find here, as in most villages: newly-privatized land
plots; old Soviet combine harvesters, long since cannibalized for
parts; middle-aged and elderly farmers –– but no youth. Everyone
who could leave, had left.327 Pani Halya and Pani Irena introduced
me to the newcomer as “nash traktorist,” “our tractor-driver,”
although they had not had a working tractor for more than five
years, nor a joint farming operation for more than eight years.328
The significance here is that the collective farm had disappeared
but collective identity remained. By 2007, this scene was by far
much more the norm than the boomtown.329
I would go back in a minute.
Serhiy, a young agricultural specialist, was excellently situated
when the land privatization measures were handed down. His
father had a seat on the local committee in charge of parcel allotments on their collective farm and so could secure choice holdings
for them; Serhiy had earned a degree in farm management from
an agricultural college; and he expressed a personal preference for
325. See IOM LABOUR MIGRATION ASSESSMENT, supra note 210.
326. See Eppinger, Law and Land IV, supra note 289, at 77.
327. See Interview with Halya Prikhoda, Irena Kirova, and Petro Kiyashko, Farmers, Former Red Star Collective Farm, in Kirovograd oblast’, Ukr. (May 31, 2007), cited in Eppinger, Law and Land IV, supra note 289, at 77.
328. Id.
329. For example, in Chernihivska oblast’, of 1489 settlements in the region, 114 now
have 10 inhabitants or less and 23 have no inhabitants at all. See Oksana Sukhova, Is it Real
to Have Effective Land Administration When There is Power Dispropriation, paper presented to
International Federation of Surveyors FIG Congress (Apr. 11–16, 2010), available at https:/
/www.fig.net/pub/fig2010/papers/ts09j%5Cts09j_sukhova_3856.pdf (describing wholesale rural flight).
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living on the farm. Yet I found him in a back office in the city
center of Kherson, selling seeds and fertilizer to farmers as
regional manager for a Jordanian agricultural inputs supplier. It
was hard to find someone of Serhiy’s generation in most villages.
Why had people abandoned their farmlands so soon after receiving
private property rights in them? Why had he?
No one organizes anything any more. We used to have cinema, right
there on our collective farm, every weekend the latest films; dances in the
summer; soccer games between our boys and the neighboring farm. Now it’s
all fallen apart. The work; the play. Nothing is organized. You go there
and you’re on your own. And it’s too much to organize everything yourself,
without counterparts on other farms or help from the center. There’s no one
to send us films, much less seeds or tractors. Kids like me would be happy to
go back to the village if someone were organizing things.330
The disintegration of rural social life, particularly but not only
labor, became a repeated theme in my interviews with rural outmigrants. Those left in the villages, however, attest to the egalitarian experience of politics.331 A portrait of this new political and
economic order emerges from one typical village, Plotno, in northeast Ukraine near the border with Russia and Belarus’.332 The productive lands of Plotno consist of fields formerly farmed for wheat
and pastures supporting a herd of some 200 cattle.333 The former
collective farm fields are surrounded by a state forest rich in the
pine and beech from which each household carefully builds up a
substantial woodpile before the first snows. Villagers avidly gather
wild foods, primarily mushrooms carefully dried for winter soups,
but also berries, honey, small game, and fish from the state forest.334 Plotno prides itself on having been wired with electrical
power during the Soviet “rural electrification” campaigns of the
late 1920s, but like many villages in Ukraine, Plotno has never been
connected to a natural gas trunkline and each household depends
on a wood-fired stove for heat during the cold seasons.335
330. Interview with Serhiy Haydyuk, Regional Manager, Agrimatko Agricultural Inputs
Supplier (Kherson city, Kherson oblast’, Ukr., (June 5, 2007), cited in Eppinger, Law and
Land III, supra note 214, at 5–6.
331. See Eppinger, Law and Land IV, supra note 289, at 91.
332. Observations of the productive activities in Plotno village and interviews were conducted by the author in September 2009, with follow-up interviews over the subsequent 18
months.
333. See Eppinger, Law and Land IV, supra note 289, at 91.
334. Id. at 94–95.
335. See Eppinger, Law and Land III, supra note 214, at 105.
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Plotno itself is a settlement of wooden houses dating from before
the 1930s, each skirted by a plank-fenced yard in front and a substantial kitchen vegetable garden in back; a few local administrative
buildings, school, clinic, and general store; and the deserted and
decaying former collective farm cattle shed.336 The lands of the
collective farm that encompassed Plotno were divided and allocated only after the new Land Code passed in 2001. Each household received a long, narrow strip of about two acres.337 Most of
that land has gone to seed. Fewer than a tenth of it is farmed by its
current owners, and none grow grain. Cultivation serves subsistence needs. Those that cultivate beyond their kitchen gardens
grow potatoes, carrots, or beet-roots for human or livestock winter
provision or hay for livestock in the winter.338 The rest of the former collective farmland now under private ownership lies uncultivated, occasionally foraged by the villagers’ cattle. The few
households that have cultivated their collective-farm parcel—and
managed to turn a profit—also keep a pig.339
The only vestige of collective farm cultivation that still produces
food or livelihood is the collective-farm apple orchard. Understood as a unique resource, the 10 acres of apple trees outside the
village have not been apportioned to any one owner during privatization.340 Rather, each household helps itself to as many apples
as it cares to gather in season. Villagers complain that the orchard
is declining in production because of the lack of systematic care for
the trees.341 It still supplies more than all of the households who
bother can gather, and apples fall rotting into the early autumn
grass.
The current mayor had formerly been the village high school
teacher before becoming the town mayor, he admitted with a shy
smile when prompted by a neighbor.342 That older neighbor
proudly confided she is the village king-maker, taking credit for
picking the village teacher to stand for election. It had not been
easy to convince him. “The new one, he’s letting me down too, but

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See Eppinger, Law and Land IV, supra note 289, at 89.
Id.
Id. at 89–90.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 93.
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no one else will do it.”343 In fact, in this village of now 400
residents, a disproportionate percentage over 45, with more than
two decades of post-Soviet political power and nearly thirteen years
since decollectivization, constraints on concentration of power and
structures favoring egalitarianism were so strong – there was so little wiggle room for public advance or private gain – that it was
getting hard to scare up volunteers to run for local office every
election.344
Others in the village confirmed this post-Soviet experience with
elected government. “So, you were the head of the village council?” I asked Serhiy. Serhiy, one of the few car owners in this hardscrabble village, had been drafted into driving me to the train station five miles away because he regularly receives milk from my
hosts’ cows. “Yep, 2002–2006. First and last time,” he smiled ironically, his gold molar replacements gleaming, bemoaning the
“thankless job”: “all our resources go to Kyiv and no help comes
back. Somehow you have to do something with this impossible situation, you want to and everyone expects you to.”345 This was a
strange result of multiparty democracy and the dissolution of a unified village economic organization. Elections in their village were
free, everyone agreed, but no one really wanted to hold office.
C.

Review of the Ghost Town

In this Section, I reviewed the legal and policy measures introduced to divide up collective agricultural holdings and to lift state
restrictions on mobility over the first ten years of Ukrainian independence. Legal measures to institute private property rights in
land were shaped by conceptual categories, allegiances, and habits
from the collectives and embroiled in political struggles over executive versus legislative power, or between klani whose clients
encumbered those branches. I also described some of the ways
those changes affected local practice and experience. How do
these results stack up against claims and predictions made in privatization models? For property owners in the ghost towns, private
property did not create wealth. It was, instead, a nail in the coffin
of a system of agricultural production, social safety net, identity,
343. Interview with Tyotya Ksyusha, Farmer and Former Head of Dairy Production for
the Collective Farm, Plotno Village, Sumi oblast’, Ukr. (Sept. 20, 2009), cited in Eppinger,
Law and Land IV, supra note 289, at 89–90.
344. See Eppinger, Law and Land IV, supra note 289, at 89.
345. Interview with Serhiy Khlib, Farmer and Former Town Mayor, Plotno Village,
Sumi oblast’, Ukr. (Sept. 21, 2009), cited in Eppinger, Law and Land IV, supra note 289, at
90.
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and social organization. While the ghost town was disastrously less
successful than predicted in reaping the productivity gains
expected from decollectivization, it was remarkably more democratic, with local property owners enjoying greater political power
than in the past vis-à-vis collective farm leadership and local Party
leaders. The ghost town is populated by the lonely autark, impoverished, calling self and fellow villagers by identities held in the
long-gone collective farm rather than by “farmer” (Ukrainian and
Russian fermer), a term I only heard used by policy types and investors in the cities. Many preferred rural life, if it was organized into
a modern system of mechanized farming and community action.
As individual private property owners, they found themselves in
conditions of autarky that struck them as premodern. The city, or
the corporations within it, offered the closest approximation to a
modern life, life in a collective mode, within their known set of
alternatives. One self-designation for this younger generation of
literate strivers—not those who found blue-collar work, but those
who managed to find white-collar jobs in the new corporations of
Ukrainian cities—is offisniy plankton, “office plankton,” surviving
adrift at the bottom of the food chain.346 Those in the exceptional
case, the fortunate farmers of the boomtown, found in their oligarchic patron someone willing and able to reconstitute a form of
modern, collective production. They were not insensitive to some
of its power imbalances; what they enjoyed were benefits they associated with a resurrection of the kollektiv: training, new equipment,
belonging, wage labor, reduced exposure to weather and other
farming risks. In both cases, the former collective farmers conceived of themselves as workers in a modern enterprise.
British sociologist Guy Standing, analyzing a global wave of economic reforms that transfer risk and insecurity onto workers and
their families, has identified a group that loses; for them, he has
coined a demographic term that seems etymologically particularly
apropos in the former Soviet space: the Precariat.347 The figure we
see emerging from the ghost town, then, is the Precariat, those
who materially suffered a net loss from liberal reforms and those
who have thus far successfully scrambled through but who experi-

346. See, e.g., Kateryna Grushenko, In Recession, Employers Look for High-Fliers, not “Office
Plankton”, KYIV POST (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/in-reces
sion-employers-look-for-high-fliers-not-of-51507.html.
347. See GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 1 (2011) [hereinafter STANDING, PRECARIAT].
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ence vulnerability and fear becoming a loser for reasons beyond
their control.
V.

CONCLUSIONS: PROPERTY IN THE PRESENT, DEMOCRACY
SUBJUNCTIVE
A.

IN THE

Three Accounts of Property, Reconsidered

In Western legal scholarship, several traditional accounts of the
relationship between property and political community give rise to
the conviction that private property, prosperity, and democratic
self-governance are mutually reinforcing. My aims in this Article
are not to refute any one of those traditional accounts but are
rather more modest: to disaggregate, compare, and reframe. The
first aim is to disaggregate claims from separate accounts that ideology had lumped together. Considering them as separate
accounts reveals liberty, wealth, and democracy as organizing principles of political community all thought to ensue from private
property ownership. Often cast as part of the same package, we see
they arise from different accounts that have not always understood
themselves as mutually complimentary. A second aim is to compare predicted results of land privatization with lived experience of
it. The results we observe in post-privatization Ukraine vary from
Western predictions. These findings stand as a warning against
what anthropologist Carolyn Rouse calls “development hubris”348
and as a challenge to the projection of Western social formations
and epistemologies onto others. Another aim is to reintroduce the
notion of contingency in analyzing social effects of property. Our
reply to the pre-existing accounts’ rhetorical question, Doesn’t private property create prosperity and democracy, is rather, “not necessarily,” at least in two respects.
First, the effects of creating private property can vary, even
within one polity. In Ukraine, we see clearly bifurcated results. In
the boomtowns, we see remarkable productivity gains accompanied
by significant disempowerment of the new landowners. In the
ghost towns, we see fairly robust democracy, at least among those
left, but impoverishment. The same reform processes might create
inflow of investment and outflow of population, wealth or empowerment, boomtown or ghost town. Private property is, itself, not
sufficient to predict outcomes.
348. Carolyn Rouse, Development Hubris: Adventures in Trying to Save the World
(unpublished manuscript under review, 2014).
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Second, reform processes might create exactly the expected
result, but not only that result. Private property might create
wealth as predicted but the original account may not have
addressed distribution of wealth. It could be that an associated
effect—such as distribution—proves more significant in the constitution of political community. In the empirical case at hand, in
addition to concern with the wealth of the nation, a Jeffersonian
concern with distributions of property and wealth at the founding
of a new polity might also be germane to the quality of the emerging political community.349 Our endorsement of Jefferson’s agrarianism is limited. Jefferson’s own repugnant slave-holding practices
lead us to reject his claims about a necessary relationship between
property, farming, and civic virtue. Further, romanticizing the selfsufficiency afforded by subsistence agriculture, a hard sell in Jefferson’s time, is even more difficult to sustain in our own when subsistence agriculture would suffer in competition with industrial
agriculture and its economies of scale. Rejecting Jefferson’s politics of property virtue and the presumed empowering material base
of subsistence agriculture does not defeat the overall concern on
which we rest, that unequal control over property may have deleterious effects on construction of a political community that aims to
be a democracy.
B.

Two New Figures and One Turn of Events: The Oligarch, the
Precariat, and Revolution

Several central figures still dominate the imagination of Property
scholarship today: the Rugged Individual, the Free-Wheeling
Trader, the Self-Sufficient Democrat. Looking to the former
socialist space, prior property accounts prepared scholars to see
individuals heretofore unluckily trapped in tragic collectives poised
to become one of these figures if enabled by privatized property.
What these accounts did not equip scholars to recognize was the
Kollektiv; what they were not equipped to predict was what might
emerge from the Kollektiv. The Ukrainian case brings to light two
other possible figures. One is the “winner” from property reforms,
the Oligarch, by which we mean both the person heading a political-economic social formation and the aspirants—managers, rivals,
dreamers—that would be head. Possible connections between the
349. Sunstein was thus wrong to focus on small-holder empowerment through subsistence agriculture, at least absent much broader change in world agricultural production.
The larger question of distribution, rather than autarky, should have been the focus of
Sunstein’s argument.
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arising of the Oligarch and the Kollektiv350, entrepreneurial governmentality,351 or other structures of late socialism await further
study. I propose that, democracy rhetoric aside, the creation of
private property is a necessary precondition for the arising of the
Oligarch in the former socialist space. A second figure is the loser
of liberal reforms, the Precariat, by which we mean the person who
did not gain, socially or economically, from these reforms even if
they made her a property owner de jure. This group also includes
the class of people who have not lost yet: who fear, reasonably,
becoming a loser of the reforming economy.352
In the case examined herein, several unexpected turns of events
associated with these figures followed land privatization in
Ukraine. One was the massive “flight from property.” Rural
residents who had already stayed on the farm through ten years of
post-Soviet economic depression took flight in mass exodus from
the countryside only after decollectivization and their endowment
with private property ownership.353 Some explanation for flight
comes from villagers themselves. They were modern workers used
to factory farming in an organization characterized by division of
labor, specialization, steady income, and certain forms of companionship and sociability. Decollectivization meant the loss of that
and a shift to autarkic production. It was modernity and its forms
of collective production that evoked pride and stability in the
boomtown and inspired flight to cities, the next closest social formation to the one they had lost, from the ghost town.
A second unexpected turn was the arising of a “super-renter”354
class of oligarchs. Food processing and transport enterprises funnel the produce of the countryside through limited hands to market. Know-how and connections funnel the collateral value of
smallholders’ parcels to financial markets. Smallholders depend
on gatekeepers and middlemen for interaction with sources of
international financial capital and representation in the political
capital. The revolution of 2014 in Ukraine saw mass precariat protests against an increasingly authoritarian klan and against oligar-

350. See infra Section II.A.3 (proposing the Kollektiv as the central figure arising from
Soviet collective land ownership).
351. See Yurchak, Entrepreneurial Governmentality, supra note 261.
352. For a sociological description of the precariat, see generally STANDING, PRECARIAT,
supra note 347.
353. See infra Section IV (describing lands and villages abandoned after privatization).
354. VERDERY, VANISHING HECTARE, supra note 223, at 310–38.
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chy in general.355 In 2011, Standing had raised the question of
when the Precariat would turn “from theater and visual ideas of
emancipation” a lá the Occupy protests to effective action, which to
his imagination at the time meant “a set of demands that will
engage the state.”356 In 2014, Ukrainians skipped from engaging
the state to overthrowing the government in attempt to permanently dislodge oligarchy. Their success in that endeavor has yet to
be determined.
My claims about the relationship between land privatization and
the Ukrainian crises of 2014 are also modest. I do not claim that
following Western property advice directly caused the revolutions,
counter-revolutions, and state vulnerability of 2014. I do suggest
that those who offered advice, opinion, and scholarship—with the
best of goodwill and intentions—in the early 1990s revisit the scene
now that that advice has been implemented. I further propose that
the 2014 revolutions cannot be understood without taking into
account relationships between property, oligarchy, and precarity.
Mindful that the story is not over, an equilibrium state has not
been reached, history is still unfolding—the Precariat may yet
become the self-sufficient citizenry or re-dominated by oligarchy—
we also suggest that in other contexts, the relationship between
property and state vulnerability is due for re-examination.
C.

Property and Political Community

We view the scenario in Ukraine, then, with one eye on ourselves. Reviewing the legislative history of land privatization in
Ukraine reminds us of a recursive relationship between law and
authority. Legal positivism takes authority for granted: law is a
genre of speech act issued by a particular set of authorities. The
post-Soviet context, under conditions of rupture, shows instead a
dialogic relationship between the speech act, a social and political
structure still in formation, and the unsettled position of the party
issuing it.357 That party is jockeying for power, playing for
resources, and trying to establish authority.
By 2004, in national politics Ukraine enjoyed a lively democracy
in the sense of hotly contested elections whose outcome was not
355. See, e.g., Andrew Higgins & Andrew E. Kramer, Archrival is Freed as Ukraine Leader
Flees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2014, at A1 (describing the overthrow of one oligarchic klan in
the 2014 revolution).
356. STANDING, PRECARIAT, supra note 347, at 3.
357. See Monica Eppinger, Sages, Savages, and Other Speech Act Communities: Culture in
Comparative Law, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 407 (2013) (proposing performativity can serve as a
basis for analyzing components of culture).
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predetermined. Examining our use of the term “democracy” more
closely, however, we see a difference between democratically
selected leaders and functioning citizen self-governance. National
elections increasingly reflected contests between rival oligarchs to
select which klan would populate state institutions. National politics seemed to have become the province of an elite using it as a
field on which to compete amongst themselves. Citizens increasingly seemed spectators to politics.
Enter the Precariat. The protests of 2013 brought millions to
activism. The oligarchic presidency they deposed in February 2014
exposes the extent to which political and economic elites had
come to overlap: an economic elite pays for elections from the
profits of the privatized sectors and a political elite uses government positions to leverage information asymmetries or otherwise
secure profitable assets. This scenario recalls concerns about “regulatory takings” as a threat to property and thus liberty until one
realizes that the private sector is no refuge. It is even unclear that,
for elites, a private sector distinct in actors or schemes of action
from a state sphere exists. Social facts highlight the possibility of
an identity relationship between political and economic elites. The
current citizen challenge to them reopens a political ontology oriented towards an open future, towards the way that things could
be.
The picture revealed by this investigation raises concerns in
other contexts about relationships between property and democracy, or more precisely, between the propertied and broad citizen
self-governance. The data here remind us that property and
democracy are both emergent institutions, not static, in any context. Emergent, contingent, and not always mutually felicitous.
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